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1.1 Introductory remarks 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union a new economic order was set up in Russia. At the same time 
a new world was revealed for private entrepreneurs and investors. However, this new world was not 
ready-made for Western investors. The collapse of the Soviet Union left a vacuum of appropriate 
legislation for dealing with a market economy. Being used to a command economy, learning to think 
in terms of “private property” was an enormous change to the Russian population, both in economic, 
as well as cultural and legal terms.  The transition to a market economy necessitated comprehensive 
changes to the Russian legal system, so a series of new regulations were introduced. The models for 
these regulations were borrowed from other national jurisdictions with long traditions for market 
regulations, namely Western countries. When drafting the law of post-Soviet Russia, it has been 
extensively developed with foreign legal assistance, in particular the U.S and Germany.1 On the one 
hand, this provided an opportunity for lawmakers to engage in the construction of new and 
outstanding legislation within different fields of law, without being constrained by local legal 
traditions (e.g. common law and civil law).2 On the other hand, their lack of understanding of the 
law’s social environment in Russia, and the unfavorable market conditions that prevailed at that 
time, meant that they might also implement inappropriate legal solutions.3 Russia has been a sort of 
laboratory of comparative law reforms whose end is not yet in sight.4  
 
Perfect legislation does not necessarily lead to a perfect society. It is essential that the law fit into the 
social and cultural “landscape” it is supposed to regulate, and to define the landscape in a transition 
                                                 
1
 P. 637, in Butler W E, Russian Law, in: Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, ed. Smits, J. S., Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 2006 (hereinafter, Butler 2006).  
2
 See for example Black S B, Kraakman R and Tarassova A S, Guide to the Russian Law on Joint Stock Companies, 
Kluwer Law International, 1998 (hereinafter, Black, Kraakman and Tarassova). The authors where actively involved in 
the construction of the Russian Act on Joint Stock Companies (see full reference in n 38), and they make note on how 
this Act was constructed as hybrid between mainly American and German law. 
3
 The word “law” is utilized in this thesis as the latin word “jus” (corresponding to the word “recht, “droit” “derecho”, 
“rett” “право”), i.e. it does not designate formally adopted written legal acts, but the norms that emanate from them . For 
the sake of distinction, the author utilizes the word “act” or “legal act” when referring to written law (written legal acts 
formally adopted by bodies recognized in the Russian Constitution and by court decisions). In Russian, the word 
“закон” is applied for legal acts. Differently, see e.g. Alekseev, p. 461, footnote 1 (Alekseev S S, Theory of Law, in: 
Russian Legal Theory (Butler W. ed), Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited 1996, hereinafter Alekseev), is using the 
word “jus” as a translation of “право”, while “law” is used as a translation of “закон”. 
4
 Butler 2006, p. 635. 
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economy is not an easy task.5  As a consequence of the law-making processes of the 1990s, the 
number of legal reforms and amendments in Russia has been high ever since, with step-by-step 
adoptions to the law to adjust for gaps and meet the current needs of society. It would be 
inappropriate to say that a full-fledged Western business environment was created in Russia. 
Nonetheless, much has been done, and the extreme business environment of the 1990s, with its 
lawlessness and deterioration of civil society, are fortunately a covered distance.  
 
The Russia of today is quite different. Since 2000, it has had an average economic growth rate of 7 
% per year. Norwegian-Russian trade has increased by 91.6 % and Norwegian exports to Russia 
have increased by 334 %, since 2000. Doing business in Russia involves big risks, not the least of 
which is due to the remaining imperfections of the Russian legal system.  As such, the potential for 
massive profits is accordingly high. The present imperfections in Russian legislation may deter a 
law student from further examining this topic, or on the other hand, trigger a genuine interest to 
understand this evolving legal system. This thesis is a testament to the latter, and will therefore 
examine company law, which is one of the core elements of market economy regulation. 
 
Another interesting aspect of writing about Russian law is the fact that for many foreign lawyers, 
businessmen and investors, Russian law may seem as something unknown and different. This thesis 
thus attempts to also cast light on a field of law that is practical from a foreign investment point of 
view. Moreover, the author hopes to reveal that Russia, despite some negative, high profile cases 
(for instance, the Khoderkovskiy-case), is after all for the most part a “normal country” in a certain 
sense of this expression.6  
 
For Western entrepreneurs and investors, company law is essential. Foreign investment is made by 
company transactions, which include direct investments and portfolio investments into companies. 
Consequently, it is crucial for investors to understand how well the investment made into a company 
                                                 
5
 T. Mathiesen ”Retten i samfunnet” (the Law in the Society), 5 edn, Pax, 2005; the “landscape” metaphor may be more 
commonly expressed in Anglo-American law as the concept of “law in books and law in action”. In his sociological 
work on the question of why some legal acts works better than others, Mathisen uses the term “landscape” as metaphor 
on the social environment of the law; i.e. in short, if the specific legal acts does not comply with and is adjusted the 
social phenomena it is supposed to regulate, the act will not work as indented. 
6
 It is referred to e.g. Shleifer & Triesman, A Normal Country, 83 Foreign Aff. 20 (Mar.-Apr. 2004), provided in p. 5 in 
Black, S B et al, Report to Russian Center for Capital Market Development: Comparative Analysis on Legal Regulation 
of the Liability of Members of the Board of Directors and Executive Organs of Companies (English Language Version) 
(February 2008). ECGI - Law Working Paper Series 103/2008 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1001990. 
The countries in comparison are, beside Russia, inter alia, Germany, UK and the U.S.. The Report was delivered 
December 2006 (hereinafter, Black et al).  
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is protected, and to what extent they may be able to maintain control of the company and its 
business operations. According to recent studies, the presence of legal and regulatory protections for 
investors explains up to 73% of investors’ decisions of whether or not to invest in a foreign country.7  
By contrast, company characteristics, i.e. the financial state of the company, explain only between 4 
% and 22 % of this decision.8 According to Doing Business 2009, the Russian Federation scores 
only 5 points out of 10 in the Investor Protection Index.9 The level of investor protection is highly 
dependent on the extent of liability for managers.10 As the discussion in this thesis will show, there 
are several questions with regard to liability in company relations that are still not fully determined 
for an emerging field like Russian company law (in which the only liability for managers was 
criminal and administrative liability before 1992). Therefore, an important factor for attracting 
foreign investments into Russia is to clarify, and possibly expand, the extent of liability for 
managers. Central to this picture is the extent of liability for the executive body in Russian 
companies. The executive body possesses wide powers, according to Russian company legislation. 
This power can be abused or can be used in ways which may inflict losses on the company, and 
hence, indirectly on its shareholders.  
 
 
1.2 Why the focus on executives? 
When establishing or buying into a Russian company it is common practice to appoint a Russian 
CEO.11 This has practical reasons; one being the slow bureaucratic process for obtaining work 
permits for a foreign CEO. As a matter of Russian statutory law, the executive body has the right to 
                                                 
7
 See Doing Business 2009, Europe and Central Asia, by IFC (the International Finance Corporation). The Doing 
Business surveys by IFS (a Word Bank Group) apply an evaluation of the degree of investors’ protection as one out of 
ten main indicators to survey a country’s business environment. The “Protecting Investors” measurement consists of, 
inter alia, mapping the extent of managers’/directors’ liability, the extent of disclosure of information to shareholders 




 Doing Business 2009, Europe and Central Asia, p. 18.  
10
 L.c.; In this thesis, the term “managers” is to be understood as a generic term referring to the members of the board of 
directors and the executive body. 
11
 In this thesis, the term “CEO” (Chief Executive Officer) is to be understood as a single natural person holding the 
position as the executive body. In practice, this body may be called “president”, “general director” etc.  
 With “executive”/”executive body”, this is to be understood as nearly all forms of the executive body, but mainly 
indented at the CEO. The terms exclude, however, the collegial executive body (CEB). This is due to the fact that there 
are some particularities with regard to the CEB formation, and this is outside of scope of the thesis (see further section 
1.4). 
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sign in the name of the company, to bind the company and to represent it.12 From a shareholders’ 
point of view, this makes the liability question with regard to executives practical due to their 
interests to restore losses in the company caused by the executive body. If a decent degree of trust is 
not already established with regard to the CEO, the question of how to obtain a sufficient degree of 
control over his business conduct is essential. It is possible to restrict the powers of the CEO by 
introducing suitable changes to the company’s articles of association, but this may, on the other 
hand, lead to less efficiency in the daily business operations, as the executive will have less latitude 
when dealing with the daily business operations of the company. In this way, the question of 
liability for the executive body is essential for securing the interests of the investor. 
 
In comparison to the U.S., for example, it should be added that the distribution of shares in Russian 
joint stock companies is quite consolidated.13 This, in combination with a tradition of heavy 
involvement of major shareholders in the day-to-day operations of companies, along with a lack of 
distinction between the company’s property and the major shareholders’ property,14 causes a need 
for strong legal protection of the interests of minority shareholders against a powerful corporate 
entity like the Russian executive body.15 To the extent that there is a lack of compliance with 
company laws, internal company documents like the articles of association and minority 
shareholder’s rights, this can be considered a direct result of the domination of managers in many 
firms 16 
 
There are ongoing debates in Russian legal literature concerning the development of company 
legislation, and the legislation will probably continue to undergo major changes.17 The legal 
institution of damage claims in company relations is somewhat weakly developed in Russian law 
and practice.18 There have been relatively few cases against executives,19 though this number is 
                                                 
12
 His competence may be limited by the articles of association (see section 3.4); See Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, 
pp. 397-398. 
13
  P. 234 in Dobrovolskiy V I, Protection of Corporate Property in the Arbitrazhniy Court (Защита корпоративной 
собственности в арбитражном суде), Moscow, Wolters Kluwer, 2006 (hereinafter, Dobrovolskiy). 
14
 It is referred to a conference held on corporate governance issues at Higher School of Economics in Moscow the 2nd-
4th of November 2007. 
15
 Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, p. 16. 
16
 P. 231 in Wolk G, Corporate Governance Reform in Russia: the Effectiveness of the 1996 Russian Company Law, In: 
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 219, 1999 (hereinafter, Wolk). The article is dedicated the problems 
with managers’ strong position in Russian companies and the problems this cause with regard to minority (or even 
majority) shareholders. 
17
 Butler 2006, p. 35. Here it is expressed that Russian post-Soviet law as “embryonic” and “remains undetermined”.  
18
 Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, p. 15. 
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increasing.20 It is quite apparent, however, that this does not reflect the reality regarding 
infringements on the company by Russian executives.21 Another fact, emphasized by many Russian 
authors, is that a Russian executive will often not be solvent enough to restore the extensive losses 
in a big company.  This is due to the fact that he is relatively poor compared to the losses the 
company incurred by him, and/or because his assets are hidden, which is still quite common in 
Russia. This does not, however, eliminate the potential importance of this remedy in corporate 
relations.22 
 
1.2.1 The legal concept of “liability” 
Liability means the legal responsibility for one’s acts or omissions.23 Generally, under Russian law, 
there are four types of liability that may be assigned to the executive: criminal, administrative, civil 
and disciplinary liability. This thesis only focuses on civil liability. However, other types of liability 
or other means of protection of rights do not limit a claim for damages.24  
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
19
 When doing searches on Konsultant (the full version updated at Oktober 2008), one will find approximately 300 cases 
(the database provides decisions from Federal Arbitrazjniy Courts and Supreme Regional Courts, which are third 
instances, in addition to the Supreme Court and Supreme Arbitrazjniy Court) that are somehow connected to 
liability/responsibility (in Russian this is the same word) for the executive body (searches on the phrase 
“liability/responsibility for the executive body”). Notably, because of some shortcomings in the search tools, the same 
cases do not always appear and others appear twice (for instance, because a case might have been at first rejected on 
procedural grounds and then re-filed). Moreover, not all cases are registered in the system. However, a closer review of 
the cases found will show that only less than 50 will actually treat liability for the executive body. Approximately 40 of 
these will be based on the articles 71 in the JSC Act and 44 in the LLC Act. Many of the cases treating liability for the 
executive do not go into the substance of the claim for damages (especially is this the case if there are a variety of legal 
provisions that the claim is based on). The actual number of court cases that is actually worth examine is therefore low 
(cf. section 2.4.3). About one fifth of the cases are filed with the General Jurisdiction Courts and the rest with the 
Arbitrazjniy Courts (see section 5.4).  
20
 See p. 468 in Osipenko O V, Conflicts with regard to the Operations of the Management Bodies in Joint Stock 
Companies (Конфликты в деятельности органов управления акционерных компаний), Moscow, Statut Publishers, 
2007 (hereinafter, Osipeneko). P. 50 in Astapovich A, et al, Corporate Reform and Harmonization of the Corporate 
Legislation of Russia and EU (Корпоративная реформа и гармонизация корпоративного законодальства Росси и 
ЕС), 2nd edition, Moscow, Wolters Kluwer, 2007 (hereinafter, Astapovich); Black, et al p. 622; Black et al p.168 asserts 
that it is nowadays “rather frequently”. 
21
 P. 62 in Molotnikov A E, Liability in joint stock companies (Ответственность в акцюнерных обшествах), Moscow, 
Wolters Kluwer, 2006 (hereinafter, Molotnikov). 
22
 This is emphasized in heading 4, section 5, subsection 7 in Makarova O A, Corporate Act: Textbook (Корпоративное 
право: Учебник), Moscow, Wolters Kluwer, 2005 (hereinafter, Makarova). The further paginating of this article will 
refer to the headings, as there is no paginating in the version provided in Garant database. 
23
 See for example, <http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/liability> or 
<http://dictionary.law.com/default2.asp?selected=1151&bold>; Hereinafter, the term “acts” and “actions” includes 
omissions. 
24
 See commentary to article 15 in Sadikov O N (editor), Commentaries to the Civil Code of the Russian Federation 
(Комментарый к гражданскому кодексу РФ), Moscow, INFRA M, 2006 (hereinafter, Sadikov) (only the articles are 
referred to, as this book is provided by Garant database, which did not provide pagination). 
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A claim for damages is known as the remedy to restore a loss. The remedy aims at restoring 
damages caused by the fault (restoration motive), and serves as a measure to prevent people from 
failing to meet their responsibilities (prevention motive). 
 
Civil liability is generally understood as a failure to meet a civil responsibility/obligation, whether it 
stems from a contractual relationship or a non-contractual relation. A failure will leave the 
wrongdoer (a legal or physical entity) open to a lawsuit for restoring damages caused upon the 
sufferer.25 In this way, if one does not meet his responsibilities, he is liable. The essential difference 
between contractual and non-contractual liability is that the former is provoked when a party 
violates provisions in the contract (or legal provisions regulating and complementing the type of 
contract in matter), while the latter is provoked by tortious acting in a non-contractual relationship. 
As the relation between the executive body and the company is based on a contract, contractual 
liability will be targeted in this thesis. 
 
There are several forms of civil liability, whether it is in relation to a contractual or non-contractual 
relationship. According to most Western legal systems, liability can be strict,26 fault-based,27 strict 
liability with exceptions from force majeure or so-called control-liability.28  
 
1.2.2 The concept of “executive body” in relation to the company and its shareholders 
The executive represents the company in its daily business operations and signs in the name of the 
company. This implies that a third party’s claim, based on the actions of the executive in capacity of 
such, may only be directed against the company itself. Thus, it is the company, as a legal entity, that 
may become liable in its outward relations. Moreover, if we turn to the internal relationship between 
the executive and the company, this is based on a contract between two independent legal entities. 
This implies that the executive may become liable vis-à-vis the company (or vice-versa), if the 
executive fails to act in accordance with the contract (i.e. civil liability stemming from a breach of 
contract). More specifically, this contract is a labor contract insofar as the executive is not a 
                                                 
25
 The word “wrongdoer” is applied for the person that a claim for damages is directed at.  
26
 This implies that the wrongdoer will be liable without regard to whether the act leading to the damage was done 
negligently or not. “Negligence” is the subjective condition of assessment under the fault-based liability. 
27
 Fault-based liability is the type of liability taking into consideration the defendant’s negligent acting. Also called 
subjective liability or culpa liability, the pendant to strict liability. 
28
 This type of liability may be compared to the strict liability with exceptions for force majeure. This type of liability 
implies a strict liability that is limited by the wrongdoer’s possibilities to prevent the fault, i.e. strict liability within his 
“sphere of control”.  
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managing company (for the managing company, see section 3.4.3.2). Generally inherent to 
contractual provisions are mandatory legal provisions or principles that regulate the type of contract, 
such as the Principle of good faith in contracts, which most Western legislations provide for in their 
law of contract.  
 
The shareholder, as another legal subject, is not a part of the contractual relationship that exists 
between the company and its executive body. Therefore, as a starting point, they have no right to 
plead the company’s claim for damages against the executive. However, as it is in most Western 
legislations, if certain preconditions are met, the shareholder is entitled to claim the company’s loss 
against managers in the company on behalf of the company. This is due to the fact that if the 
company suffers an economic loss, it will indirectly harm the economic interests of the shareholder. 
The shareholder’s right to claim for the company’s damages is aimed at securing the shareholder’s 
financial interests in the company (investor protection), as well as protecting the interests of 
minority shareholders. For example, a company has an obvious claim against the executive as a 
result of his misbehavior. However, the executive might control the majority of shares in the 
company and thus be able to prevent a claim for damages from the company. In this situation, the 
shareholder is entitled, under certain conditions, to pursue a claim on the company’s behalf.  This 
type of lawsuit is often referred to as an indirect lawsuit or a derivate lawsuit. The former term will 
be used in this thesis.29 
 
1.3 The objective, delimitations and structure of the thesis 
The objective of this thesis is to clarify the norms and conditions regulating how the shareholders 
and the company can be awarded damages when the latter has suffered an economic loss on the 
basis of the executive body’s improper actions. The thesis also assesses situations where a 
shareholder may claim a personal loss that results from the executive’s actions. The main focus is on 
claims that are based on articles 71 in the Joint Stock Company Act (hereinafter, the JSC Act and 44 
in the Limited Liability Company Act (hereinafter, the LLC Act).30 
 
                                                 
29
 Cf. n 145 for an explanation of these terms. 
30
 Federal Act on “Joint Stock Companies” of 26 December1995 (Федеральный закон от 26 декабря 1995 г. N 208-
ФЗ “Об акционерных обществах”). 
Federal Act on “Companies with Limited Liability” of 8 February 1998 (Федеральный закон от 8 февраля 1998 г. N 
14-ФЗ ”Об обществах с ограниченной ответственностью”). 
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To comply with the objective, the thesis seeks to discuss the major components to be examined in a 
claim for damages against a Russian executive. The following is a brief overview of the thesis and 
its components, including the delimitations of the thesis. 
 
As the thesis is written for non-Russian lawyers and the author is himself a foreign student of 
Russian company law, this calls for a more comprehensive account of methodological aspects and 
Russian sources of law, which is discussed in section 2. In section 2.1, comments on comparative 
method are provided. Comparative method deals with many similar problems that are encountered 
under the preparation of this thesis. The comparative elements throughout the thesis are mainly 
drawn from Norwegian law, with some Anglo-American and German law, to provide a bigger 
picture. In this way, it is sought to elucidate and illustrate, and to some degree evaluate, the features 
of Russian company law and liability for the executive. In order to provide a framework when 
examining the legal questions in this matter, section 2.2 reflects upon the sources of law in a Russian 
context, while sections 2.3-2.6 consist of an introduction to Russian sources of law and their 
application. Special attention is given in section 2.3 to the state of case law in Russia, since this 
differs from many other national jurisdictions, in particular common-law systems. 
 
In section 3, an overview of the Russian corporate legislation is provided to give the reader 
references to the general concept of company law in Russia, as well as comparative references to 
other national jurisdictions. An overview is also included of the different types of companies that the 
Russian company legislation provides. The thesis focuses on Russian joint stock companies 
(hereinafter, JSC) and limited liability companies (hereinafter, LLC),31 as these are widespread and 
the conditions for an approbation of claims for damages against the executive body are quite 
                                                 
31
 The term “JSC” includes so-called open and closed forms of JSC (see full reference to the JSC Act in n 30). The open 
ones have the abbreviation “ОAO” (открытое акционерное общество, OAO), the closed ones have the abbreviation 
“ЗАО” (закрытое акционерное общество, ZAO). The “LLC” has the abbreviation “OOO” (общество с ограниченной 
ответственностью) (see full reference to the LLC Act in n 30).  
A limited liability company is usually understood in Western legislations as a type of company in which the liability for 
the shareholders for the debt of the company is limited to the share value. In this sense, also JSC companies are “limited 
liability companies”.  Because of this, Butler 2003, pp. xix-xx, points out that it will be more accurate to translate the 
LLC as “limited responsible society”, in order to make this distinction visible and reserve the LLC form for the general 
conception of shareholders’ limited liability. In this thesis, however, the more widely known term “limited liability 
company” (“LLC”) is used when referring to companies in the LLC Act. (cf. Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, applying 
the term ”limited liability societies” when describing the Russian company type LLC). Moreover “company” is 
translated in Russian to “общество”, which means “society”. In this thesis it is translated to “company” owing to the 
fact that for a foreign lawyer these terms are generally and easily understood, and moreover, the legal concept is the 
same. See for a more detailed reasoning of this matter in Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, p. 98; See Gashi-Butler and 
Butler, p. vii and Butler 2003 p. xiii-xvii. 
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similar.32 Furthermore, in section 3.4, an account is given of the various forms of the executive body. 
The executive body may have the form of a single general director, such as a CEO, a managing 
company, which is a legal entity, or a collegial executive body that consists of a group of persons. 
The CEO is the focus in the thesis since this type of executive body is the most widespread and the 
extent of this thesis does not allow for a more extensive analysis. Hence, any special features of the 
liability for the members of a collegial executive body (hereinafter, CEB33) will not be discussed in 
this work.34 It should be added that this form is rarely applied in Russia. In regard to the managing 
company, the thesis assesses the particulars on the liability of such an executive body.35  
 
As a result of the executive’s action, he may be subjected to different types of claims from the 
company or the shareholders.36 The constellation of different claims is discussed in section 4 and is 
provided as an overview of these claims. In this thesis, it is the company’s direct claim (see section 
4.1) and the shareholder’s indirect claim (see section 4.2) that is in focus.37 This is due to the fact 
that the stockholder’s direct claim in certain situations (see section 4.3) has a more limited extent of 
application, while the shareholder’s direct non-contractual claim (see section 4.4) may not turn out 
as a legally-relevant base for the claim.  This legal remedy is not known to be utilized in company 
relations in Russia, and thus, only has more theoretical applications. Another type of legal remedy 
that is often closely connected to a claim for damages is the claim for invalidation of a deal. In the 
thesis, the invalidity remedy will not be discussed more than necessary for elucidating the 
regulations and the state of law concerning claims for damages. 
 
Section 5 discusses commencing the claim before the courts and procedural problems in relation 
with a claim for damages against the executive. 
 
                                                 
32
 See e.g. Black, et al p. 224. 
33
 Russian:”коллегиального исполнительного органа общества”; Norwegian: “kollegialt utøvende organ” (hereinafter 
will pinpointing ”Russian” and ”Norwegian” in these translations discontinues). 
34
 Much of what is discussedd in this thesis, will, however, be relevant to the assessment of damage claims against the 
members of a CEB, as the thesis assesses standards in the fault-based liability. 
35
 See particularly sections 3.4, 5.3, 5.4 and 7.6. 
36
 The LLC Act makes use of the word “participant” and the JSC Act the word “stockholder”. Both the participant and 
the stockholder own a share in the company’s capital. In this thesis the term “shareholder” will be used when referring to 
both participants and stockholders as a generic term. 
37
 A “shareholder’s direct claim” in this thesis is to be understood as a claim from the shareholder against the executive, 
without the involving the company, or filing a lawsuit in the name of the company. The “company’s direct claim” is 
understood as the situation, in which it is the company in its own name that commence the lawsuit, represented by its 
competent managing body. 
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Section 6 treats the material conditions for awarding damages in contractual relations that 
commonly applies to all contracts. As mentioned in section 1.3.2, the relationship between the 
executive and the company is of a contractual nature. In addition, there are special laws that regulate 
certain types of contracts and provide different legal bases for contractual liability.  Such legal 
liability bases are discussed in sections 7 and 8.38 Most of the focus in this thesis will be on article 71 
in the Act on JSC and article 44 in the Act on LLC, since these are the main and general bases for 
liability for the executive body vis-à-vis the company, and thus, its shareholders. The liability bases 
in these articles are discussed in section 7. In order to give the reader an overview of special legal 
basis for a claim for damages, other than articles 71 and 44, this is treated in section 8. Many of 
these legal bases are, however, partly overlapping and serve as alternative bases. 
 
In addition to basing the claim for damages on a liability basis, as discussed in section 7 and 8, the 
sufferer must present an economic loss as a result of the violation for being awarded damages. The 
economic loss condition is discussed in section 9. Furthermore, the economic loss must be caused by 
the violation (proximate cause). The causality condition is discussed in section 10. The two latter 
conditions are discussed with particular regard to article 71 in the JSC Act and 44 in the LLC Act. 
                                                 
38
 The legal concept of “liability basis” is not that widespread in Anglo-American law. In civil law communities this is, 
however, essential, as a claim for damages must be explicitly legally founded in a “liability base”. This is for instance a 
provision in a legal act or custom that entitles a sufferer to claim for damages on certain conditions (see for instance 
Craig, Ronald,  Norwegian – English Act Dictionary (Stor norsk-engelsk juridisk ordbok), Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 
1999, under “ansvarsgrunnlag” [“liability base”], hereinafter, Craig). 
 16 
2 Method and sources of law 
2.1 Comparative method and coping with the language and cultural barrier 
In a given legal system, the law consists of not only the written “raw” law.39 The law in force is a 
product of refinement and interpretation of competent authorities, local lawyers, scholars and other 
applicants of the law.40 Therefore, it is inevitable that a Norwegian student writing in English about 
Russian law will encounter some problems during the examining of the foreign law that he is not 
facing when examining his domestic legal system. Comparative method provides reflections on such 
problems when examining foreign law. Therefore, comparative method is discussed in the 
following, while also demonstrating that many of the methodical problems in this thesis are of a 
general nature. 
 
Studying a foreign law-system creates particular problems. First, foreign lawyers lack the 
understanding of the legal culture of the jurisdiction in question.41 A lawyer is normally socialized 
into his national legal community with an understanding of the national history, religion and culture 
of that community.  Knowledge of how the law works is naturally influenced by these internalized 
norms and perceptions. This forms a context of how the law is interpreted and understood in a given 
society, which the foreign lawyer or comparatist has to be aware of when examining the local law. 
For instance, “source of law” may be interpreted quite differently by Russian and American lawyers, 
particularly when it comes to case law. Furthermore, there are no any well-established comparative 
methods to overcome the barriers of adapting to a foreign legal culture.42 Bearing this in mind, and 
taking this into account when examining foreign law, the comparatist or foreign lawyer may be able 
to avoid such misunderstandings; in as much as he familiarizes oneself with national legal theory 
and the system of sources of law, beside the analysis of the written legislation. 
                                                 
39
 P. 870 in Vogenauer S, Sources of Law and Legal Method in Comparative Law, in: The Oxford Handbook of 





 The term “legal culture” has been applied by some comparatists to identify some basic common comprehensions of 
legal realities between lawyers. See e.g. p. 175 in Mark van Hoecke Deep Level Comparative Law  in: Mark van Hoecke 
(ed.): Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law, OR 2004, s. 165-195 (hereinafter, Hoecke), or David 
Nelken (hereinafter, Nelken D, Legal Culture, in: “Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law” (Smits, J. S. ed.), Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited, 2006-, who discusses more profoundly the definition and the concept of “legal culture”. The 
term of “legal culture” is much debated in comparative law literature, but essentially it provides a comprehension of law 
which is broader than the given sources of law within in a particular legislature.  
42
 See Hoecke pp. 167-169.  
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Second, studying the law in a foreign language complicates the interpretation of the law. Even 
within one language, words may have diverging denotations according to regions, professional 
groups, cultural background, etc. Nevertheless, when coping with foreign words and terms and their 
legal application, it is imperative that the comparatist understands the legal reality and the 
underlying conception of the term in the local legislation.43 Nevertheless, the underlying concept is 
understandable for both. Thus, it is paramount that the comparatist or foreign lawyer gives the 
foreign legal language thoughtful reflection during their examinations of the local law. Accordingly, 
it is appropriate to provide a couple of remarks regarding some of the special features of the Russian 
legal system as a reference for what these differences might entail. To begin with, Russia has 
imported much of its legislation in the civil law sphere from other Western jurisdictions (see further 
section 3.1).44 One of the main problems when importing legal models (e.g. a company model) is the 
understanding of the legal concepts (e.g. liability for managers45) in these models.46 Once imported, 
the concepts adapt to the national environment and the foreign origin of the imported legal concept 
may be taken into consideration only as a possible aid to understand and interpret it in a broader 
sense.47 In this way, apparently similar concepts (for instance the concept of “limited liability 
company” or “fault-based liability”) do not necessarily implement all of the features from the 
original legislation, although the core elements remain the same. As Russia is characterized within 
the Romano-Germanic family and a part of Western legal culture,48 many legal terms and concepts 
will be familiar for a student from a Western national jurisdiction, and especially a civil law 
jurisdiction. In this sense, a foreign student should be careful when encountering terms that are 
apparently equal to conceptions in his domestic law. It should be added, though, that most Russian 
comparatists categorize Russia today as a “transitional legal system”, belonging to neither the civil 
law system nor the common law system. 49 This is due to the fact that much of the legislation within 
the sphere of private law is imported from different Western legislations.50 This makes it even more 
                                                 
43
 Hoecke pp. 174-175. 
44
 The Russian civil law sphere can be compared to what is called private law in Norwegian. 
45
 See definition of this term in n 10. 
46
 P. 517 in Doronina N G, Semilutina and N G, Employment of Foreign Concepts of Law and Definitions in Russian 
Market Economy Legislation, in: Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, vol. 13, p. 499, 2003 (hereinafter, 
Doranina and Semilutina). 
47
 Ibid pp. 517-518. 
48
 Butler 2006 p. 636; Hoecke p. 175. 
49
 Butler 2006 p. 635. 
50
 Pp. 289-290 in Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko Law and Legal System of The Russian Federation, New York, Juris 
Publishing Inc, 2004 (Hereinafter, Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko). Here it is laid out a short description of the origin 
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vital to examine the legal concepts and terms in the proper national context, as the original concepts 
and terms may not be consistent with the Russian understanding of them. The intent, therefore, is to 
give the reader an insight into the system of Russian sources of law and to dwell upon how essential 
legal concepts and terms in the sources examined in this thesis are actually applied.51 
 
2.2 The concept of sources of law in Russian law 
In order to make a just comparative study of foreign law, a comparatist inevitably has to deal with 
legal reasoning and legal methodology of the national law in question, and in particular the concept 
of “sources of law”. This term is widely expressed in Western legal culture (i.e. “source du droit”, 
Rechtsquellen, “fonti del diritto, Fuentes del derecho, “rechtsbronnen, “rettskilde” and the Russian 
“источник права”). Even within a jurisdiction this term may not be applied consistently, and 
amongst various national legal systems, the concept may comprise different legal understandings.52  
 
In legal systems which are dominated by a more positivistic concept of law, a narrower perspective 
of “source of law” prevails. A narrower perspective of the concept “sources of law” contrasts the 
plurality thesis of sources of law, which for example is prevailing in Norwegian legal theory.53 
Russia is an example of a legislation, in which a positivistic approach rules. Russian legal practice 
and theory has a rather formalistic approach to its sources and the hierarchy of sources is strict.54 The 
most common understanding in Russia of what “sources of law” refers to is written law, which is 
adopted by the competent body in correct forms.55 Below, in section 2.3-2.7, various sources of law 
are delineated. This is based on the sources that are acknowledged in a national legislation with a 
pluralistic approach, like the Norwegian legislation, in order to give a broader account.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
of the Russian Civil Code; Doronina and Semilutina p. 499, 2003 give some examples of foreign concepts of law and 
definitions imported into the Russian market economy legislation. 
51
 All translations are the author’s own (with the help of dictionaries like www.multitrans.ru and ABBYLingvo) as there 
are not, insofar as the author is aware of, any official translations. Where there are quotes, the Russian wording has been 
provided for in footnotes. Some central terms is also translated into Norwegian. 
52
 Vogenauer, p. 877. 
53
 See eg Graver H P, The Emporers Wardrobe: The Teachings of Eckhoff’s Doctrine of Sources of Law and Future 
Challenges (Keiserens garderobe: Eckhoffs rettskildelære og utfordringer fremover), in: “Journal of Legal Theory” 
(Tidsskrift for rettsvitenskap), p. 429, 2000. 
54
 Butler 2006, p. 631; Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko, p. 23 are discussing the evolvement of general principles and 
natural law, despite the “prevailing doctrine of legislative positivism” in Russia. 
55
 See for instance the Yandex Big Legal Dictionery (<http://slovari.yandex.ru/dict/jurid/>) under “source of law” 
(“источник права”). The term “sources of law” is in many cases connected with the term “normative acts” 
(“Нормативные акты”), which means adapted acts by the legislator. The Journal of Russian Law (Журнал 
российского права) regularly provides articles on this topic, showing some of the ongoing debates in this legal field. 
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2.3 The Russian legislative hierarchy – the written law 
The sources of law are indirectly deducted from the provisions in the constitution. More precisely, 
the provisions govern the adoption of legal acts from various bodies with a legislative authority and 
these legal acts are the “sources of law”.56 The Constitution has the highest rank. International law 
and convention takes priority in cases of contradiction to other legal acts, pursuant to the 
Constitution article 15, section 4. Thus, the Russian approach to international law and conventions is 
monistic, so that after ratifying a convention, it is considered binding for the courts as internal law. 
Furthermore, there are Constitutional Acts, which are rare and not relevant to questions that concern 
the subject matter in this thesis. The most widely applied sources of law are “federal acts”57 Some 
are called “codes”58 and other called federal acts, but they have the same rank. The codes are often 
of a more general nature, while federal acts are of more specific nature that supplement existing 
codes; in particular this is the case with regard to the Civil Code in relation to other federal acts 
within the civil law sphere (see section 3.2).59 
 
Other governmental acts include Presidential edicts, federal bodies’ legal acts, acts adopted by 
federal subjects. These must not be contrary to the legal acts at the federal level, and they do not 
touch upon issues related to civil liability. 
 
Furthermore, the Constitution’s delineated sources of law are reaffirmed as sources by Arbitrazjniy 
Procedural Code60 (hereinafter, APC) article 13, section 1 and Civil Procedural Code61 (hereinafter, 
CPC) article 1, section 3article 1, which more specifically list sources of law in the civil legislation. 
For instances, analogies in the civil law sphere is provided for, pursuant to the APC, article 13, 
section 6 and the CPC article 1, section 3 (for an explanation of the Arbitrazjniy court, see section 
2.4.2), as well as in the Civil Code article 6. Insofar as the author has been able to reveal, the court is 
extremely cautious to extend the wording or apply analogies with regard to company law. 
                                                 
56
 E.g. Butler 2006, p. 632 is listing up the Russian sources of law; See e.g. Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko chapter II, 
for a more elaborated description of the Russian sources of law. 
57
 “Федералый закон”; “føderal lov”. 
58
 “Кодекс”; “kodeks”. 
59
 “The Civil Code ” part 1 30 November 1994, part 2 26 January 1996, part 3 26 November 2001, part 4 18 December 
2006 (Гражданский кодекс Российской Федерации часть первая от 30 ноября 1994 N 51-ФЗ, часть вторая от 26 
января 1996 N 14-ФЗ, часть третья от 26 ноября 2001 N 146-ФЗ и часть четвертая от 18 декабря 2006 N 230-ФЗ). 
60
 “The Arbitrazhnyy Procedural Code” of 24.07.2002 (Арбитражный процессуальный кодекс Российской 
Федерации от 24 июля 2002 N 95-ФЗ). 
61
 “The Civil Procedural Code” of 14.11.2002 (Гражданский процессуальный кодекс РФ от 14 ноября 2002 N 138-
ФЗ). 
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Furthermore, it is mentioned that the court may also apply, “custom business practice”,62 if such 
application is provided for by the material legal acts in questions, as for example it is provided for in 
the Acts on JSC and LLC, articles 71 and 44. 
 
 
2.4 Russian Courts system and juridical practice as sources of law 
2.4.1 Judicial practice as source of law 
Russia is considered a civil law country,63 where the court system is in principle not a creator of law 
and, and is therefore fully bound to the legal acts adopted by the legislature.64 Additionally, the court 
system was weak and ineffective during the Soviet-era, and under the communist regime, case law 
was excluded. The Constitution does not mention case law, neither do APC or CPC, which implies 
that this is not a formal “source of law”.  
 
However, precedent is now gaining momentum.65 Naturally, often will the wording of the legal act 
in question not apply to the concrete case. Thus, there is a need to clarify the application of the law, 
contradictions and unclear wording in legal acts and to secure the unity of court rulings. Because of 
this, there is an ongoing discussion of whether or not to recognize precedent more formally. Judicial 
practice is increasingly being recognized in Russian legal doctrine and practice as a source of law, 
whether in the form of juridical decisions having the value of precedents, or in the form of judicial 
explanations (for an example in a Information Letter, see next subsection) filling gaps in legislation 
or offering interpretations of provisions.66 The Russian Supreme Arbitrazjniy Court (hereinafter, 
SAC) and Supreme Court (hereinafter, SC) refer to their own practice in their resolutions, as do the 
                                                 
62
 “обычаи делового оборота” (this term is translated with several nuances, e.g. “usual business practice”, “good 
business custom” etc”; Norwegian; “sedvanlig forretningsomsetning” (this is literally translated, a translation implying 
more of the legal reality would be ”sedvanlig forretningspraksis”).   
63
 See eg Doronina and Semilutina, p. 510. 
64
 Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko, p. 15. 
65
 Pp. 145-146 in Roudik P, How to Conduct Research in Russian Law, in: International Journal of Legal Information, 
vol. 28:1, p. 143, 2000 (hereinafter, Roudik); Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko, p. 15 et seq. This is also the author’s own 
impression when discussing with Russian scholars. 
66
 Butler 2006, p. 632; Roudik, p. 146. 
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lower courts.67 Furthermore, it is widespread practice amongst barristers to refer to court practice, 
and in legal literature it is widely referred to when accounting for, and discussing the state of, law.68  
 
When studying Russian law, one frequently encounters the perception that the “real problems in 
Russia have not been so much the legislation itself, but how and whether it is applied, who applies it, 
and whether it is changed when it no longer corresponds to reality”.69 These problems have also 
been addressed in connection with the application of the JSC Act and the LLC Act, as well as to the 
numerous incidences where companies failed to comply with the JSC Act at the expense of 
investors.70 Although the JSC Act relied on a “self-enforcing” concept (see section 3.1), the courts 
conscientious compliance with the law is essential.71 The courts are doing better in this regard today 
than when the Act was adopted in 1995,72 but problems remain. For instance, besides a correct 
application of the law, there are problems with executing a favorable court ruling (see section 5.3.1). 
 
2.4.2 The Russian court system 
In Russia, there are three court systems: the Constitutional Court, the Court with General 
Jurisdiction (hereinafter, GC) and the Arbitrazjniy Court (hereinafter, AC). The latter two have the 
Supreme Court (SC) and the Supreme Arbitrazjniy Court (SAC), respectively, as the highest 
instances. The AC is a special court with “jurisdiction within the sphere of business and economic 
activity”,73 according to article 1, APC. As a main rule, the AC deals with cases between legal 
persons, while the GC deals with cases between physical persons and between legal persons and 
physical persons. In the latter cases, however, there are exceptions with regard to cases between a 
company and company managers or former managers (see section 5.4), as these cases mostly adhere 
to the jurisdiction of the AC. This split court system between the AC and the SG has no parallel in 
the private law sphere of most western countries.74  
 
                                                 
67
 See for further elaborations with regard to increasing emphasize on court precedent in Burnham, Maggs and 
Danilenko pp. 15-22.  
68
 See e.g. p. 8. in Ivanov I V, Principles Regulating the Operations for Managers in Joint Stock Companies (Принципы 
деятельности управляющих акцюнерного обшества), in: “Journal of Russian Law” (Журнал российского права, no 
5-6,  pp. 1-10, 1999 (hereinafter, Ivanov 1999). 
69
 P. 272 in Gogek D, Russian Company Law Reform: Have Flawed Laws Impeded the Transition to a Market 
Economy, In: McGill Law Journal/Revue De Droit de McGill, vol. 41 p. 269, 1995 (hereinafter, Gogek). 
70
 Wolk, p. 219. He comments in his article on several such incidences. 
71
 Black, et al, pp. 4-5. 
72
 See e.g. ibid, p. 5. 
73
 “Правосудие в сфере предпринимательской и иной экономической деятельности”. 
74
 See e.g. Black et al, p. 183. 
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The GCs consist of district courts on the first and second instances, and serve as the second instance 
for the peace court.75 The third instance is the Supreme Courts of the republics. The highest instance 
is the Federal Supreme Court.  
 
The AC consists of 82 first instance courts throughout the Russian Federation.76 The second instance 
is called the “appellate” court.77 The third instance is the Regional Federal Arbitrazjniy Court 
(hereinafter FAC), which usually is the highest level. This is also called the “cassation” court,78 
depending on the type of appeal. FAC can serve as both a third instance and second instance, thus 
bypassing the appellate court in certain type of cases. 
 
The SA and AC have supervisory functions over the FAC and the Supreme Regional Courts and 
may accept appeals from FAC and the Supreme Regional Courts in rare situations. Such judgments 
are called “Resolutions”.79  A second type of “Resolution” from the SAC and SC explains the 
Courts’ interpretation of specific legal provisions. In addition, the third type of judicial statement 
from the SAC and SC is called an Information Letter.80 This is an overview of how certain 
provisions should be understood, according to questions that have appeared in practice.  
 
2.4.3 The configuration of judgments 
Judgments are formulated quite briefly and explicitly.81 In the cases examined by the author, the 
typical design of decisions is to introduce the parties and the claim, refer to the legal basis and apply 
the provisions on the facts. When applying the provisions on the facts, the court can merely state 
whether the assertions of the claimant were proven or not. Subsequently, it concludes by affirming 
or denouncing the claim. In this manner, the courts do not profoundly show how the provisions were 
interpreted on the subject matter, and why the provision in question led to the conclusion. This 
makes it hard to derive any deductions on how the provisions in the relevant legal acts are actually 
applied and interpreted. In relation to the assessment of the fiduciary duties that are stipulated for the 
                                                 
75
 See the homepage of the Supreme Court <www.supcourt.ru/eng>. 
76
 See for instance the Supreme Arbitrazjniy Court’s homepage <www.arbitr.ru/eng 
77
 “Апелляционной”; ”anke”. 
78
 “Кассационной”; ”anke”. 
79
 “Постановление”. See same translation in Roudik, p. 144; “resolusjon”/”dom”/avgjørelse. 
80
 “Информационное письмо”. 
81
 Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko, pp. 391-392 lay out more formally the prescribed content of the judgments. 
Furthermore, (p. 392) it is stated that Russian judicial decisions are “relatively short compared to those in common-law 
countries and even in some other civil-law countries,”.  
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executive in articles 71 of the JSC Act and 44 in the LLC act (see section 7), the court often avoids 
discussing why an action was, or was not, considered “reasonable”, “loyal” and “in good faith”.  
Consequently, it does not leave much of a guideline for an assessment of these standards.82 
 
2.5 Doctrinal writings and legal literature 
Legal literature and doctrinal writings are not a source of law in Russia. The courts do not refer to 
literature in court decisions.83 However, lawyers commonly refer to literature in their argumentation 
during court proceedings.84 Besides, Russian scholars are the senior figures in the Russian legal 
establishment, and thus able to indirectly influence the legislation process.85 
 
2.6 Preparatory works 
In Norway, use of preparatory work of legal acts plays a major role as a source of law. In Russian 
law, however, preparatory works are not considered as a source of law, not applied by the courts and 
rarely commented upon by scholars and practitioners.  
 
2.7 The application of sources of law in this thesis  
Due to the fact that the legal field of the subject matter has only existed in Russia for 15 years, it is 
still being developed and occasional shortcomings remain.86 Thus, an exposition of this field of law 
will inevitably seem a bit “superficial” in comparison to more developed fields. In comparison, 
Norwegian law is based on more than one hundred years of legislation, so court practice and theory 
has naturally resulted in a more nuanced state of law. For example, when examining Russian 
literature in this field, it is apparent that there are diverging views and different understandings 
among authors. Court practice also reveals different understandings of the conditions for awarding 
damages. However, unsettled legal questions can be identified in all types of jurisdictions. In this 
thesis, the approach has been to stick strictly to the wording of the provisions as the primary source 
when laying out the discussion, which is in line with the positivistic approach to source of laws (see 
section 2.2). As far as possible, the author has attempted to utilize court practice in the discussion, 
                                                 
82
 E.g. see North-Caucasion District Court, 17 August 2006, no. F08-3470/2006. This resolution is so brief that it is not 
possible to properly review the reasoning of the court with regard to the subject-matter of the case. 
83
 E.g. Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko, p. 392. 
84




 See e.g. Astapovich, pp. 49-51.  
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despite the fact that this approach is not officially recognized as a source of law and the court 
practice is quite briefly substantiated (see section 2.3.3).  
 
Furthermore, a main resource for this thesis has been Russian legal literature. Although it is not a 
source of law, it is an important legal resource for practitioners and provides and understanding of 
the legal reasoning. The latter is particularly true, seeing that the comparist’s need to understand the 
legal environment and legal culture is taken into account. 
 
The last point to be mentioned is the challenge of ensuring that all relevant sources and aspects of 
the addressed questions have been thoroughly researched, since the author is a foreign student that is 
working within limited time constraints. Nevertheless, the author has been able to follow nearly all 
essential references and cross-references to legislative acts, court practice and theory that have been 
provided in relevant articles, books and court practice.87 The resources for the thesis consist of 
several books, articles and electronic legal database tools, such as “Garant” and “Consultant”.88 In 
addition, in order to ensure the correct Russian perspective, the author has carried out several 
conversations and interviews with Russian scholars.89 Nevertheless, due to some incompatible, 
diverging perspectives with regard to liability questions for executives, several aspects of the state of 
law will in this thesis be left undetermined.   
                                                 
87
 However, the reader should be aware of the possibility for that some relevant material might has been missed out. 
88
 These legal bases are the most widespread legal tools in Russia and contain legal acts, written theory and court 
practice. 
89
 These have been, inter alia, Molotnikov (researcher Moscow State University, Tshaikovskaya (Professor Higher 
School of Economics), Starzhenetskiy (Head of the International Department at the Supreme Arbitrazhniy Court). 
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3 An overview of Russian company legislation 
3.1 Russian company law in its historical context 
In order to carefully examine the state of law with regard to a complicated topic such as liability for 
the executive body, an account of the legal-historical context of the field of company law is given in 
this subsection, and more specifically the history of the making of the acts. 
 
In this thesis, “company law” is used in the conventionally understanding as “the 
law that articulates company structure and regulates relationships among 
shareholders and between shareholders and company managers.”90 Moreover, the 
term “company law” is not a uniform concept in Russian law.91 According to many 
Russian scholars, such concepts may be perceived as “entrepreneurial law”, 
commercial law” or “corporate law”.92 The distinctions and naming of legal 
branches in the civil law are not all settled in Russian theory and it is a subject of 
ongoing debate. The term “corporate law”93 has, however, gained a foothold.94  
 
Most jurisprudential trends in the last century bypassed the legal thinking during the  
Soviet-era. 95 Generally, the “private law eradicated under Soviet-times … and rendered it lifeless”.96 
Thus, the re-creation of civil law was essential after the break-down of the Soviet Union.97 During 
the Soviet-era, Russia had little need for an extensive regulation of companies and it was limited to 
some general regulation on trading associations.98 However, the legal phenomenon of the 
“company” was not a totally new legal concept. As Cogek points out, before the revolution and 
during the N.E.P. period of the 1920’s, company legislation existed, and some comprehensive 
company acts were adopted in the Soviet Union from 1987-1990.99 Moreover, the dissolution of the 
                                                 
90
 Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, p. 20; see n 10 for definition of the term “manager. 
91
 P. xiii in Butler W E, Russian Company and Commercial Legislation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003 
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Soviet Union resulted in greater receptiveness to interdisciplinary approaches to legal phenomena 
and concepts in the civil law.100  
 
Russian civil law is, to a large degree, imported from the German legal system.101 In several 
instances, one might say that Russian legislation has gone through several generations, moving 
sometimes to or from Anglo-American approaches to continental European approaches.102 The Act 
on JSC is often considered to have been significantly influenced by U.S. company law and by the 
German law on joint stock companies.103 This hybrid becomes visible when the Act’s composition of 
the company’s management structure is examined. The Russian JSC Act and LLC Act alternatively 
provide a two-tiered board system, in which a supervisory board of directors may be formed in 
addition to the executive body (which is common in Germany and Norway), and a one-tier board 
system, which consists of only the executive body (which is common in the UK and U.S.).104  
   
 A one-tier board system is a board of directors which usually consists of executive 
directors and non-executive directors. It is the CEO
105
 that heads this board. Thus, there is 
only the executive body (as collective executive body, or alternatively only with a CEO) 
and no formation of a supervisory board of directors. A two-tier board of directors system 
implies that there is an executive body, headed by the CEO (or just the CEO without the 
formation of a collective executive body), who is subordinate to a separate supervisory 
board of non-executive directors. 
 
The modern regulation on JSC started with a regulation on JSC adopted in 1990 together with a 
number of other legal acts that regulated JSC.106 There were several shortcomings of these early 
regulations and a main defect was that the regulation was not well adapted for a planned economy 
that was transitioning into a market economy.107 In 1993, a working group of lawyers, including 
foreign legal experts, started to draft a new act on JSC. An important aim was to make the act 
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attractive for foreign investors.108 Due to the fact that Russian courts at that time worked quite 
slowly, most judges were educated in the Soviet-era and there was a general lack of understanding 
of business regulation, the company law had to depend on courts as little as possible.109 The drafting 
was based on a principle called “self-enforcing” company law. The core of this model was an effort 
to harness the incentives of participants110 in the company, especially large minority shareholders, in 
order to provide meaningful protection to these shareholders despite the absence of the multiple 
private and public enforcement resources of developed countries.111 One way to obtain “self-
enforcement” is to create bright-lined and clearly defined statutory provisions.112 The new Act on 
JSC was adopted in 1995, although with several amendments from the draft made by the Russian 
Duma. Over time, the JSC Act has undergone major revisions, most notably in 2001 and 2006. 
 
The Act on LLC was adopted in 1998 and is similar in structure and concept to the JSC, but is 
intended primarily for small business.113 This Act is considered to have been significantly influenced 
by the German Act on LLC.114 
 
3.2 The Civil Code and the relations to other federal acts 
The Civil Code regulates most of the civil law (or private law) in Russia, and the Code “must be 
regarded as a pivotal act of the civil legislation as a whole”.115 For example, it regulates every type 
of contract, regulation on inheritance, intellectual property, civil liability and company types and 
structure. It contains four parts, and it is the first part that is essential to the subject-matter of this 
thesis.  The first part consists of 453 articles, with the numbering of the articles running 
continuously through all four parts. The first chapter of the first part is called “general 
regulations”.116 This chapter outlines basic features and outlines of legal and physical entities, 
including the different types of companies. The second chapter is named “Property rights and other 
rights in rem”.117 The third chapter is named “General part of the obligation law”.118 This chapter 
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contains, inter alia, regulation on contractual liability.  Part two regulates special types of 
obligations. Here, inter alia, non-contractual liability is regulated. The remaining parts of the Civil 
Code have no relevance to the subject-matter of this thesis. 
 
In addition, there are several special federal acts which provide particular regulations and 
supplement the Civil Code. In this way, company law consists of the Civil Code and the special acts 
that regulate various aspects of company regulation.119  Examples include federal acts like the Acts 
on JSC and LLC, the Federal Act on “Foreign Investments” and the Federal Act on “Competition 
and Limitations of Monopolistic Activities in Commercial Markets”, just to mention a few.120 
 
Occasionally, the system with general and several special acts may lead to overlapping provisions. 
A general principle of the interpretation of Russian legislation stipulates that if two sources of law 
on the same level contradict each other, the more specific law should be referenced.121 The Civil 
Code, however, postulates in article 3 that other federal acts must comply with the Code (insofar as 
the provision in the Civil Code is not facultative, thus, it derogates in favor of other federal acts and, 
if specified, contracts). However, as is the case with liability as well as with other regulations, there 
will be several provisions in the Civil Code providing a framework regulation on liability, which 
supplements the special legal bases for liability in the various special federal acts. Thus, instead of 
trying to solve an apparent overlap between a general provision in the Civil Code and a provision in 
a federal act by favoring one to another, the question is more of interpreting the federal act provision 
in the light of, and supplemented by, the provisions in the Civil Code.  
 
Besides the Civil Code and the Acts on JSC and LLC, the Labor Code regulates the relationship 
between the executive and the company, as this relationship is based on a labor contract. Today, 
there are ongoing discussions in Russian literature on how the company legislation and the labor 
legislation relate to each other, and the questions of whether the labor legislation or the company 
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legislation is the main regulator of this relationship.122 Pursuant to article 69, section 3, subsection 3 
in the Act on JSC, other legislation is subordinate to this Act in cases of contradictions. In this way, 
it seems that the JSC Act takes priority. Such subordination is not mentioned in the Act on LLC. If 
the same applies, this deduction would rest upon an analogy. However, according to article 5 in the 
Labor Code, other legal acts containing provisions that define the labor relationship (in the same 
manner as company legislation) must comply with the Labor Code. Both the labor legislation and 
the company legislation enjoy the same rank, thus, the Lex Superior rule does not solve the problem. 
The Lex Specialis rule does not help in this situation either, as it can be argued that both the Labor 
Code and the JSC and LLC Acts are “specifically” applicable to the relationship. On the one hand it 
is a special type of labor relationship and on the other hand the labor relationship is a special 
relationship within the general company legislation.123 This causes problems when attempting to fire 
the executive, to garnish his compensation, etc. With regard to liability, these questions do not 
influence the conditions for claiming damages on the basis of articles 71 and 44. However, the 
Labor Code provides an alternative base for liability (see section 8.1). 
 
3.3 Types of companies 
Russian company legislation provides for a range of different legal entities. They can be divided into 
two groups: companies with limited liability for its shareholders and those with full liability. 
Companies with full liability include individual companies (sole proprietorship),  partnerships and 
agricultural cooperatives.124 A hybrid between full and limited liability companies is supplementary 
liability companies (limited partnership). There are three types of companies with limited liability 
that are specifically regulated by the JSC Act and the LLC act, in addition to the general regulations 
in the Civil Code. There are two types of JSC: an open and closed one,125 both of which are 
regulated by the Act on JSC. The open one is aimed at large companies, and is often registered at the 
stock exchange market. The closed one is typically intended for smaller companies of no more than 
50 stockholders126 (according to the JSC Act, article 7), in which there is a limited option to transfer 
stocks to third persons. The regulations concerning liability for managers are the same for both 
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types. More precisely, the main liability base is article 71. The third type of company is one with 
limited liability (named “OOO”). These companies are usually small companies consisting of 
participants who each own a part127 of the company and usually are participating more actively than 
shareholders in joint stock companies.128 The LLC form is more widely used by foreigners that are 
establishing companies in Russia.129 The LLC has become quite popular, and today rather large 
enterprises are utilizing this approach. The LLC is largely similar to the closed JSC,130 and there has 
been an ongoing discussion to phase out the closed JSC construction. The similarities of these three 
types of companies with limited liability allow for a common assessment of the liability for the 
executive. 
 
3.3.1 Types of companies compared to Norwegian law 
In Norway, the Act on Limited Liability Companies (hereinafter, the Norwegian LLC Act) and the 
Act on Joint Stock Companies (hereinafter, the Norwegian JSC Act) are parallel acts that regulate 
companies with limited liability.131 The former is intended primarily for small businesses and the 
latter for larger businesses. Both the closed JSC and the LLC might be compared to the former, 
while the latter is similar to the Russian open JSC. 
 
3.4 Governance of the LLC and JSC and competence of their bodies 
The Civil Code article 53 states that a company is operated through its bodies. The article does not 
say anything more than what is more profoundly regulated in the special Acts on JSC and LLC. 
There are more theoretical discussions in Russian legal literature about the legal nature of the 
relationship between the company bodies and the company.132 In modern Russian legal literature, 
however, this does not play any role in relation to liability questions.133 There are mandatory and 
optional bodies of governance in the JSC and the LLC. The following includes an outline of these 
various bodies. 
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3.4.1 The general meeting 
The general meeting of shareholders (hereinafter, GM) meets at least once a year (the Acts on JSC 
and LLC article 34 and article 47) and is the highest ranking body in the company (the Acts in JSC 
and LLC article 47, section 1 and article 32, section 1).134 The GM consists of all of the shareholders 
in the company. Its competence is exhaustively regulated in the Acts. As the highest ranking body of 
the company, the GM decides upon, inter alia, the sort of governance structure that the company 
shall have. The GM constitutes the articles of association and elects members to the Board of 
Directors (hereinafter, BD) if the articles of association stipulate a two-tiered board system. If a one-
tier model with only one level of governance is chosen for the company’s governance, the GM 
chooses the CEO and/or the members of the collegial executive body.  Alternatively, a managing 
company may be hired as the executive body. The BD’s competence, as it is stipulated in the Acts, 
is transferred to the GM when the BD is absent.  
 
If a BD is formed in a JSC and it is provided for in the articles of association, the BD will form and 
hire the CEO. Otherwise, the GM must form and hire the CEO. The power to fire the CEO is 
assigned to the GM, but this competence may be transferred to the BD (the Acts on JSC and LLC, 
article 48, section, 1 subsection 8 and article 32, section 2). In an LLC, the GM holds the exclusive 
competence of forming, hiring and firing the executive body. 
 
3.4.2 The board of directors 
The formation of a supervisory BD is mandatory in a JSC with more than 50 stockholders (JSC Act, 
article 64), which implies that in any closed JSC, the formation is optional since there cannot be 
more than 50 participants. The BD is optional in LLC according to article 32, section 2, of the LLC 
Act. If the BD is formed (which is more widespread, and which also provide the shareholders with 
more control), the governance system becomes a two-tiered board system involving two levels of 
governance. This implies that the BD will then supervise the CEO, the collegial body or the 
managing company.  
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The BD’s competence in both JSC and LLC consists of organizing the GM, generally supervisory 
functions and the compilation of strategies for the company. The BD can only consist of physical, as 
opposed to legal, persons.135 Its competence is defined in the Act on JSC, but may be extended by 
the articles of association. In LLC, the formation of competence is largely left to the articles of 
association and the competence is less restrained by the Act than the regulation in the JSC Act.  
The supervisory functions are, in essence, the same as in Norwegian Acts on LLC 
(“aksjeselskapsloven”) and JSC (“allmennaksjelelskapsloven”), pursuant to their respectively 
articles 6-13 (parallel articles in the two Acts). An important difference is that the BD in Norway 
holds the right to represent the company externally and has the power to sign in the name of the 
company (facultative), according to the Acts’ respective articles 6-30.  
 
3.4.3 The executive body 
The executive body is mandatory for every type of company. The executive acts in the name of the 
company without requiring power of attorney (the Acts on JSC and LLC, article 69, last section and 
article 40, section 3, number 1), and signs on behalf of the company. The Acts elaborate on this by 
stating that the executive must take care of the day-to-day operation136 of the company (the Acts on 
JSC and LLC, article 69, section 1 and article 32, section 4). The limit of his competence is 
governed first by the principle of remaining power.137 This implies that all competence that is not 
assigned to an upper body (the GM or the BD) remains at the lower body. Such assignment may be 
provided by statutory law or by the articles of association of the company (the Act on JSC, article 
69, section 2, the LLC Act article 40, section 2, subsection 4 and article 53 in the Civil Code). The 
GM, holding the competence to decide the content of the articles of association, may, by means of 
these articles of association, limit the competence of the executive. For instance, the GM might 
transfer the right to sign in the name of the company on all deals involving more than a certain 
amount of rubles to the chairman of the BD.  
 
The following summarizes the different types of executive bodies. 138 
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3.4.3.1 Single general director (CEO) 
This is the most widespread formation of the executive body in Russia, and it is formed on the basis 
of the JSC Act article 69 and the LLC Act article 40. The legal relationship between the CEO (as a 
single physical person) and the company is labor contractual, which is regulated by the Labor Code 
in addition to the Acts on JSC and LLC. 
 
3.4.3.2 The managing company  
Under Russian law, the power of the executive body may be transferred to another legal entity, 
namely the managing company, on the basis of a contract by the GM’s decision (the Civil Code 
article 103, the Act on JSC article 69 and the Act on LLC article 42). This possibility is provided for 
in both the UK and U.S., but in Norway and Germany this is a rather unknown arrangement.139 The 
managing company acts in the name of and on the account of the company, according to article 53 
in the Civil Code.  
 
This construction is mostly used by holding companies with several subsidiaries in order to exercise 
efficient administrative control.140 Moreover, the managing company usually takes form as an 
individual company.141 The relationship between the companies is governed by a civil contract. The 
more specific legal nature of this contractual relationship (for instance, whether it is a service 
contract or mixed contract) is at issue in the Russian legal literature, which debates the different 
types of contract (as provided for in part two of the Civil Code) that regulates the relationship.142 The 
specific type of contract does not impact the liability regulations. All civil contracts with regard to 
liability are generally regulated in article 401 in the Civil Code, in addition to the special liability 
bases provided for by different types of violations (see further section 6 and 7 and especially section 
7.9).  
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3.4.3.3 The temporary executive body 
A temporary executive body is also listed as one of the formations of the executive bodies in article 
69, section 4, subsection 4, in the Act on JSC. The practical function of this body relates to 
situations where the BD has fired the executive and the subsequent hiring of a new permanent 
executive remains open for approval by the GM. This is in reference to a scenario in which the 
articles of association do not confer the competence of hiring the executive body to the BD. In LLC, 
this body is not accounted for, as the hiring and firing of the CEO is under the exclusive competence 
of the GM. This implies that the participants must be summoned for an extraordinary GM in order to 
first fire the executive and then hire a new one. 
 
3.4.3.4 The collective executive body (CEB) 
This can be formed on the basis of the JSC Act article 70 and the LLC Act article 41. In LLC, it is 
the GM that elects the member of this body. The chairman of this body is also acting as the CEO. If 
members of the CEB are supposed to be members of a BD, as well, this is constrained by the JSC 
Act article 66, section 2, which stipulates that members of the CEB can only constitute one quarter 
of the BD. The CEO cannot chair the BD. The LLC Act has no equivalent regulation regarding the 
restraints on members in the BD and does not regulate who can chair it.  
 
The competence of the facultative CEB is to be determined by the GM, according to the Act on JSC 
article 41, section 1 and the LLC Act article 48, section 1, subsection 8. The CEO will perform as 
chairman in the CEB, if it is formed. The construction of the CEB is usually employed to limit the 
power of the CEO.143 The delimitation of competence between the CEB and the CEO is obliged to 
be regulated in the articles of association and other internal documents that are confirmed by the 
GM, according to the Acts on JSC and LLC, article 42, section 2 and article 70, section 1. It should 
be noted in this regard that every member bears his own liability. Hence, there is no collective 
liability for the executive body. This applies to the members of the BD, as well. 
 
For further reading, the reader should take note (see. section 1.4) that the main focus of this thesis is 
the CEO. As such, the liability for the members of the CEB will not be discussed. However, the 
standard of the liability will, in most cases, apply to these members as well.  
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4 Types of claims in cases where the executive has caused damage to the 
company and/or its shareholders  
This section accounts for the different types of claims for damages, regardless of the legal basis, that 
may be filed against the executive by the shareholders and/or the company.144 
 
4.1 The company’s direct claim against the Executive 
The Russian legislation provides for a range of various legal liability bases that apply to different 
situations where the executive may become liable vis-à-vis the company. The main and most widely 
applicable liability bases, with regard to the executive, are the JSC Act article 71 and the LLC Act 
article 44, section 5, which are the main focus of this thesis. 
 
It should be noted that article 71 provides for two different liability bases. It is the general liability 
base that can be compared to article 44 in the LLC Act and there is a special and narrower base in 
article 71, section 2, subsection 2, which only applies in certain situations. The latter is treated in 
sections 4.3 and 8.2. Hereinafter, any reference to articles 71 and 44 excludes the specific liability 
base in article 71, section 2, subsection 2. 
 
4.2 Shareholder’s indirect claim 
Article 71, section 5 in the JSC Act and article 44, section 5 in the LLC Act, provide the 
shareholders with a right to file an “indirect lawsuit” against the executive in case of a violation of 
articles 71 and 44 vis-à-vis the company.145 In JSC, the stockholder146 must own more than 1% of the 
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equity or common stocks in order to commence this action. The purpose of this remedy is to provide 
a means for shareholders to protect the interests of the company. This remedy is typically relevant in 
cases when a major shareholder protects the present or former executive, which even may be 
himself, or because the shareholder(s) wants to commence court procedures without waiting for a 
decision by the general meeting (GM). It is the shareholder(s) that may file a claim for damages 
against the executive, according to the wording of this provision. Thus, the shareholder will file the 
lawsuit in his own name, but it is the company that will, in case of approbation, be awarded the 
amount of damages (see further section 5.3.1).  This is because it is the company’s loss that is 
claimed. A restoration of the company’s loss is, naturally, indirectly favorable for the shareholders. 
 
As previously mentioned, the main focus of this thesis is the company’s direct claim and the 
shareholder’s indirect claim (sections 4.1 and 4.2), each of which are further discussed in sections 5, 
6 and 7. The following types of claims are beyond the scope of this thesis and are only described 
below to provide an overview. Section 4.3 treats two special liability bases that are respectively 
commented upon in sections 8.2 and 8.5.  Section 4.4 will not be discussed in any further detail (cf. 
section 1.4).  
 
4.3 Stockholder’s (and company’s) direct claim in certain situations 
The only place the law directly provides a shareholder with a right to claim damages against the 
executive for restoring his own personal losses (without any relations to the company) is in article 
71, section 2, subsection 2 in the JSC Act and in the Federal Act on the “Security Market” article 
22.1.147  
 
In case of a violation of the provisions in part XI.1 in the JSC Act, article 71, section 2, subsection 2 
provides the stockholders with the right to file a lawsuit against the executive. Part XI.1 concerns 
the regulation on the procedures when a stockholder acquires more than 30% of the stocks. This 
liability rule also provide a special liability base for the company against the executive, in contrast to 
the Act on the “Security Market” article 22.1, which only provides the stockholders with this right. 
The liability in the latter provision applies when information provided in prospectus due to an issue 
of stocks or securities is incorrect, which in turn leads to a loss for the stockholder. 
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4.4 Shareholders’ direct non-contractual claim against the Company and/or executive 
The shareholder is not formally a part of the contractual relationship between the company and the 
executive. Thus, as an alternative means of achieving compensation for losses other than that which 
was previously mentioned, the shareholder may base his claim on non-contractual liability for 
damages based on the Civil Code articles 1064 (general basis for non-contractual claims) and/or 
1068 (the employer’s liability for its staff) against the company. Such a lawsuit should be filed after 
he has sold the shares (in order to avoid reduction in share value as a result of the lawsuit). 
However, this remedy is, insofar the author has been able to reveal, not yet applied or properly 
discussed in theory or practice in Russia.  
 
By comparison, under Norwegian law, it is a general company law principle that claims from the 
shareholders against the company are not permitted. This is to protect the company’s creditors. Such 





5 Initiating the claim, preconditions for prosecution of the claim and 
procedural problems 
Besides the material questions of awarding a claim for damages, there are several procedural 
questions of a different nature that may hamper the approbation of a claim for damages against the 
executive. First, there are preconditions that must be satisfied in order to initiate the hearing. 
Second, there are particular features of the procedural regulation that may prevent a proper 
approbation of a claim. In addition, there is a problem with the enforcement of an affirmed claim. 
These questions are discussed below. 
 
5.1 Limitation period 
The general limitation period for filing a lawsuit is three years after the infringement on the civil 
right, according to article 196 in the chapter of limitation periods in the Civil Code. That is, three 
years since the wrongful act took place. Special limitation periods run in some instances, according 
to article 197, but these do not apply to liability cases.148 Filing a lawsuit prevents the statute of 
limitations from running (article 202).  
 
5.2 Company’s claim against the executive 
The decision to take legal action is generally embedded in the competence of the executive, since as 
he represents the company (according to the Acts on JSC and LLC, article 69, last section and article 
40, section 3, number 1).  This is not the case, however, if this competence is assigned to other 
bodies by the articles of association.149 Since the executive is unlikely to initiate a suit against him, 
the only means of pursuing the claim is to fire the executive and get a new one to prosecute the 
claim.  Another option is to assign the competence of taking legal action to another body. The 
general meeting (GM) may seize the power of the executive and transfer this competence to the 
board of directors (BD), according to the Acts on JSC article 69, section 4 and on LLC article 33, 
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sections 4 and 5. When the competent body of the company is taking legal action, the litigation 
procedure is subordinated to the ordinary procedural regulation, as it is set forth by the APC or CPC. 
 
5.3 Proceeding with an indirect lawsuit by the shareholder – procedural problems  
According to the Act on JSC article 71, section 5, stockholders150 have to hold at least 1% of the 
company’s common shares in order to file an indirect claim for damages. The LLC Act article 44, 
section 5 states that any participant,151 regardless of the size of his part152 in the company, may file a 
claim for damages. This is the starting point for commencing an indirect lawsuit. However, further 
details on the indirect lawsuit have not been specified in the two Acts and are subject for 
considerable debate in Russian legal literature.153 These procedural problems are discussed in this 
section. 
 
In comparison, under Norwegian law, the shareholders are provided with a right to file an indirect 
claim for damages in name of the company if they are holding at least 10% of the shares, pursuant to 
articles 17-4 in the JSC Act and LLC Act (most of the articles run in parallel throughout the two 
Acts). A precondition is that a proposal to claim damages against the executive on the same grounds 
has already been rejected by the GM, according to articles 17-4.  
 
The stance in other jurisdictions shows that it is rather difficult for a shareholder to file an indirect 
suit. Thus, procedural problems or cumbersome processes in relation to the indirect lawsuit are not 
unique to Russia. For instance, in Germany a set of preconditions have to be met. For instance, the 
shareholder must show that he became a shareholder before learning about the damage incurred by 
the company, that he demanded that the company take legal steps before commencing the indirect 
suit, that there are grounds for the court to believe that the company incurred damage because of 
dishonesty, and that enforcement would not be contrary to the company’s interests.154 In the UK, the 
circumstances that allow for an indirect lawsuit are so “difficult that the derivate action is virtually 
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non-existent in England”.155 The United States has also complicated procedural rules governing a 
suit brought by the shareholders.156 
 
5.3.1 The problem of not involving the company and obtaining evidence 
The company may take common legal actions together with the shareholder, pursuant to article 46 in 
the APC and article 40 in the CPC. The problem arises, however, if the company refuses to 
participate in the lawsuit against the executive.157 Not involving the company makes it significantly 
more difficult to obtain all necessary documentation in order to elucidate the grounds for the claim 
before the courts.158 One example of a problem is the difficulty of obtaining necessary 
documentation from the company’s bank, since such documentation is protected from inspection by 
a third party. Generally, a major problem arises in all situations involving the need to reveal legally 
protected corporate secrets and internal documents.159 On the other hand, if the executive in question 
is still serving as the executive, he will be the one appearing in court if the company becomes 
involved in the procedure, and it is doubtful whether that will remedy the case.160  
 
The legal status of the shareholder filing the lawsuit and the legal status of the company under the 
court procedure of an indirect lawsuit are not clearly regulated for in the law. This problem is a 
matter of discussion in the legal literature.161 For instance, one proposition is to bring the company 
into court procedure as so-called third person, pursuant to article 51 in APC and article 43 in CPC. 
However, it is not clear whether this would be the correct way to bring the company to court.162 The 
court cannot force the company to hold the status of a claimant, pursuant to articles 44-46 APC and 
article 38 CPC.163 
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Moreover, despite the fact that the literature in recent years tends to conclude that the shareholder in 
indirect lawsuits performs as a sort of representative in the name of the company,164 this does not 
provide him with any further rights to obtain necessary information from the company. Thus, the 
shareholder may only obtain information in his capacity as a shareholder or plead for applying the 
general procedural provisions to obtain evidence. When it comes to the shareholder position, for 
example, a stockholder must hold more than 25% of the stock165 in order to request full presentation 
of the protocol of the collegial executive body (CEB) (if formed) and the bookkeeping, pursuant to 
article 91, section 1. More importantly, all other company information listed in article 89 (the article 
lists various company documents like protocols, accounts etc, but does not list that type of 
documents that will be recognized as typical confidential, like internal correspondence, strategy 
documents, contracts etc.) is legally available to the stockholder. Obtaining information is slightly 
easier for a participant in an LLC, as article 8 in the Act on LLC provides full access to all 
information about the company. When it comes to applying the general procedural provisions on 
obtainment of evidences as a party to litigation, the party has certain procedural rights for obtaining 
evidence. Most practical are article 72 in APC and article 64 in CPC, which concern the securing of 
evidence upon request of a party member. Although the shareholder has these procedural rights that 
are derived from being a party to litigation, it is doubtful it provides sufficient access to the 
information needed for an approbation of the claim, considering the factual obstacles that the 
executive may use to block such information. In addition, the court’s thresholds to apply article 72 
in the APC and article 64 in CPC are high. 
 
Moreover, because of both the focus on written evidence in Russian legal tradition when it comes to 
the assessment of evidence and the high thresholds for proving the material conditions in a claim for 
damages against executives,166  approbation requires extensive documentation from the claimant (see 
section 7.5). Some of this may be remedied if the executive has already left his position and the new 
executive is more inclined to help the claimant with presenting information. Under Norwegian law, 
the court may establish the burden of proof for specific circumstances with the person that is the best 
able to reveal the information. Unfortunately, such a rule is unknown under Russian law.  
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If the losses and wrongdoing of the executive refer to deals that he has entered in the name of the 
company, it may be more appropriate in many cases to claim invalidation of these deals, instead of 
claiming damages. The conditions of getting the deal invalidated are more clear-cut and do not 
imposes assessments of vague standards, as the “negligent assessment” under the liability 
assessment. Legal bases for invalidation may be found in several areas of the legislation, such as the 
regulations on “personal interest” (see section 8.3) and “major transactions” (see section 7.7.5.2).167 
Furthermore, Civil Code articles 170 (pro forma contracts), 168 (contracts in conflict with legal 
provisions) and 178 (invalidation of contracts when exceeding one’s competence) provide a base for 
invalidation. The Civil Code articles are general and do not deal specifically with company 
relations.  
 
5.3.2 Who sustains legal expenses 
Article 110 APC and article 102 CPC state that the losing party in the case must cover the litigation 
expenses of the winning party. If a claim is partly sustained, the expenses are paid in proportion to 
the degree to which the claim was sustained, according to APC articles 110-111 and CPC article 98. 
In this manner, the shareholder will not sustain losses if their claim is affirmed. If the shareholder 
loses, he must cover the court costs.168 If one sees the shareholder as a representative of the 
company, the company will be responsible for the loss. However, there have been various 
approaches to this matter so the law remains unsettled.169 
 
5.3.3 Enforcement of an abbreviated claim for damages 
Another factual problem is the enforcement of the claim once it is affirmed. The Act on 
Enforcement Proceedings,170 article 29, section 2 yields the right to enforce a judicial decision to the 
person the decision is made in favor or interest of. In an indirect lawsuit, the decision is made in 
interest and in favor of the company. The executive is entitled to take actions on the basis of court 
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decisions and to enforce them, as the executive represents the company. This may lead to a serious 
problem if the executive is the defendant in the case and he remains in position, as it is unlikely that 
he will enforce the claim against himself. There are several real-life incidences where an investor 
has gained a favorable court ruling but the executive remained in power and the decision of the court 
was not enforced.171  
 
5.3.4 Indirect lawsuit against the managing company 
A shareholder may sue the managing company on the basis of articles 71 or 44 if he controls more 
than 1% of the common shares. The shareholder of the managed company cannot, however, directly 
sue the CEO172 of the managing company.  The shareholder can only sue the managing company as 
such, except if the shareholder happens to be a shareholder in the managing company, as well.173  
 
5.3.5 Conclusion 
When examining procedural problems with regard to the indirect lawsuit, several issues stand out 
and should be clarified by the legislature. First, Russia, in contrast to most western countries, has 
failed to define the status of the shareholder and the company (and their mutual procedural relation 
in court as well) in an indirect lawsuit, causing unnecessary practical problems. Moreover, it should 
clarify how the company is supposed to be represented in an indirect lawsuit.  
 
Furthermore, it should be provided a right to obtain classified documents and other evidence from 
the company on behalf of the shareholder.  
 
Finally, shareholders should be provided with a procedural remedy to ensure the enforcement of an 
approbated claim for damages against the executive.174 It is not acceptable that it is up to the 
executive himself, if he still is in position, to enforce the claim. 
 
Clarifications on these issues would be important steps to secure the interests of the investors and 
minority shareholders. 
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5.4 Which court has jurisdiction? 
5.4.1 The problem of overlapping jurisdictions 
The jurisdictions of the Court with General Jurisdiction (GC) and the Arbitrazjniy Court (AC) are 
defined in the CPS article 22, and articles 1 and 27-33 in the APC. In addition to the general 
objective in article 1 in the APC, which states that AC is dealing with conflicts in the sphere of 
business, article 33 states that conflicts between shareholders and the company are regulated by the 
APC, with the exception of labor conflicts. Article 22 in the CPS is much more general and 
encompasses labor conflicts. Due to the fact that the relationship between the CEO and the company 
is also a labor relationship, problems have arisen in court as a claim for damages against the 
executive in principle can be included under both jurisdictions.175 In the instance of the managing 
company, as a commercial organization with no labor contract with the company, it is clearly under 
the jurisdiction of AC.176 
 
The CEO’s breach of his obligations may be viewed as a breach of the labor contractual relationship 
between the CEO and the company, and thus may be under jurisdiction of the GC. On the other side, 
the relationship may be viewed as a company relationship and thus fall under jurisdiction of the AC. 
According to the Supreme Arbitrazjniy Court (SAC) Resolution 18 November 2003, no. 19, item 
38, a shareholder commencing court procedures in the form of an indirect lawsuit against the 
executive on the basis of article 71 in the JSC Act is generally under the AC’s jurisdiction. The 
Resolution does not touch on the situation when the company is commencing legal actions by itself 
against the (former) executive.177 The Supreme Court (SC) Resolution 20 March 2003, no. 17, states 
that GC has jurisdiction over conflicts between managers178 and the company only if the basis of the 
conflict is a violation of the Labor Code. According to the SC Resolution 24 March 2004, no. 27, 
however, a company commencing court procedures against its former executive must address the 
claim to the GC, as this is a labor relationship. Apparently, the latter Resolution contradicts the first 
two. Deducing from these Resolutions, at the very least the indirect lawsuit will be under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the AC.179 If the executive is also a shareholder, then the case will be under 
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the jurisdiction of the AC as well, as this directly follows from article 33 in APC.180 More uncertain 
is the situation with regard to a conflict between the executive and the company, as it can be asserted 
that this is in principle a labor relationship.181 Nevertheless, court practice shows that if a lawsuit in 
the first place is filed with the AC, it remains in the AC system and appellate AC courts do not 
rectify lower instances on the grounds of improper jurisdiction. Almost all of the cases found and 
examined by the author and cases referred to in the legal literature have been AC cases, regardless 
of the referred court practice and discrepancy182 For instance, a judgment by Regional Federal 
Arbitrazjniy Court (FAC) North-Caucasian District, 18 January 2007, no F08-6826/2006, referring 
to the SC Resolution 20 March 2003, no. 17 (not commenting upon, albeit, the SC Resolution of 
2004), heard a case between the company and its former CEO and stated that the GC only had 
jurisdiction where the claim was based on a violation of the Labor Code.183 Several similar cases 
filed with the AC have it accepted for decision, but leaving alone the discussion of a possible 
improper jurisdiction with regard to GC.184 In this way, the most likely conclusion is that GC will 
only have jurisdiction in cases where the claim is based purely on a violation of the Labor Code and, 
for instance, not on articles 71 or 44 in the Acts on JSC and LLC. Furthermore, judging upon the 
court practice and taking into account that most cases are filed with AC, SC Resolution 20 March 
2003, no. 17, is the closest to clarify the issue of delimitation of the jurisdictions. This implies that 
the AC has jurisdiction in all cases where the claimant bases his claim against the executive on the 
company legislation, for instance article 71 in the JSC Act, and not on the regulations in the Labor 
Code. This is appropriate due to the fact that the AC court has more competence on business 
matters. Moreover, this approach is more harmonious with article 1 in the APC.185 In particular, the 
risk of overlapping jurisdiction is a divergence of practice on the same questions between the two 
courts. For these reasons, both the AC and SAC should develop a joint resolution to clarify this 
matter.  Otherwise, the legislature will need to find a remedy.186  
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6 The material conditions for awarding damages under Russian law 
The material conditions that must be satisfied in order to be awarded damages from the executive 
are rather complicated. Most legislatures provide for different types of liability, like fault-based, 
strict liability and others. Under Russian and Norwegian law, the liability for managers187 is fault-
based. As such, the focus in this thesis is fault-based liability. Despite the fact that the outlines of the 
fault-based liability conditions under Russian law are quite similar to those under Norwegian law, 
there are features that will seem awkward to a Norwegian or another Western lawyer. This is partly 
due to shortcomings in the ongoing determination of this sphere of law. In order to frame the 
analysis, the Norwegian approach to fault-based liability is accounted for first, and then it is 
followed the Russian approach. 
 
6.1 Norwegian law on fault-based liability  
Under Norwegian law, the standard and default legal basis for claims for damages in contracts, as 
well as outside of contracts, is fault-based. The rule is based on custom. Some Norwegian legal acts 
have, however, codified this rule in specific legal areas. Subsequently, these codified provisions 
serve as the legal basis for liability within their range of application. An example of such 
codification in a relationship outside of contract is the Act on Intellectual Property,188 article 55, 
which refers to fault-based liability when exploiting another’s intellectual property. A codification 
implies that the legal basis occasionally overlaps custom, and in this way the custom elaborates the 
content of the codified rule. An example of such codification in contract is articles 17-1 in the 
Norwegian Acts on LLC (“aksjeselskapsloven”) and Act on JSC (“allmennaksjeselskapsloven”), 
which impose fault-based liability for company managers. 
 
In contract law, it may vary, depending on the type of contract and its regulation and 
the contract’s conditions, whether the legal base is a fault-based one; whether it is 
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strict liability; whether it is strict liability with exceptions for force majeure; or 




The control liability has become the most common liability rule when it comes to 
contracts of generic performance (see, for instance, the Sale on Goods Act,
190
 article 
57). Control-liability was introduced in Norwegian legislation with the compilations 
of UNIDROIT, PECL and CISG, and it has replaced the strict liability with 
exceptions of force majeure in several Norwegian acts that regulate different 
contract types. Strict liability has a limited range in contractual relations and applies 
to the situations where the defendant has a defective title, he has offered guarantees 
for his performance, or he is short of the money that the contract obliges him to pay. 
The fault-based liability is acknowledged as a universal liability rule and may be 
claimed in all contractual relationships. However, the control liability, strict liability, 
or strict liability with exceptions of force majeure, is the most advantageous type  of 
liability to base a claim for damages upon for the sufferer, as in the fault-based 
liability type the sufferer must prove the negligence of the wrongdoer.  A 
combination of contractual strict liability and non-contractual fault-based liability is 
the so-called employer’s liability for his employees. This implies that if the 
employee negligently causes damages to a third party in the capacity of being 
employee, this makes the employer strictly liable vis-à-vis the third party. 
 
The Norwegian fault-based liability depends generally on three conditions, whether inside or outside 
contract. If these are satisfied, the claim for damages may be awarded. The conditions originate 
from custom. First, a negligent act must be present. It is the claimant that should prove, as the main 
rule, the negligence. Secondly, there must be an economic loss. The third condition is that the 
wrongful act must be a proximate cause to the loss. 
 
Whether the act was negligent is due to an overall and concrete assessment. In contractual 
relationships, the breach of contract is not vital for the approbation of a fault based claim for 
damages. On the one hand, a breach would strongly indicate that negligence was present, but on the 
other hand, the absence of it does not preclude liability.  
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The negligence condition depends on the assessment of whether or not the defendant 
acted according to the “culpa standard”. Traditionally, under Norwegian law, the 
assessment of negligence consists of two assessments. The first is the wrongful act, 
or objective element of negligence assessment, which addresses whether a written or 
unwritten legal norm has been violated (typical a contractual provision or statutory 
law). The second is the subjective element, which is the assessment of the 
wrongdoer’s psychological comprehension of the wrongdoing. Today, a bit 
simplified, one might say that these elements are merged into one overall 
assessment. The negligence assessment is currently acknowledged as being based on 
the “objective” conduct of the wrongdoer, and whether he could and should have 
acted differently.
191
 In some situations, however, more explicit and distinct 
assessments of the wrongful act and the subjective element are fruitful. This is 
especially the case when assessing manager’s liability in company relations.192 As 
apparent below, such distinct assessments resemble the Russian approach. 
 
6.2 Russian law on fault-based liability 
In Russia, there is no customary law that can serve as legal basis for liability, since custom is not 
formally recognized as a source of law (cf. section 2.4). Thus, all claims for damages must be 
claimed on the basis of a statutory provision (a liability basis), whether it is a claim originating from 
a contractual relationship or whether it stems from a non-contractual relationship. The general and 
default legal regulations of claims for damages are provided for in the Civil Code. The general and 
default type of liability is fault-based liability. This is set forth by articles 401 and 1064 in the Civil 
Code. Article 401 applies to all contracts, while article 1064 applies to non-contractual relationships. 
Article 401 is non-mandatory, and consequently it is possible to derogate from it if the contract 
states that the liability is to be another than the default fault-based liability. However, according to 
section 3 of article 401, a breach of contract that is committed by a commercial party in its capacity 
as such, its liability is not fault-based, but strict with the exception of force majeure. Section 3 is 
only relevant when assessing the liability for the managing company, as this is a commercial party 
(see section 7.9).  
 
The conditions for affirming fault-based liability under Russian law do not differ extensively from 
the conditions for liability under Norwegian law. The conditions for damages are first, the presence 
of a wrongful act, second, the act has been committed negligently by the wrongdoer (see sections 
                                                 
191
 Hagstrøm, p. 10. 
192
 Aarum, pp. 187-189. 
 49 
6.2.1-6.2.3 for elaborations),193 the third, the presence of an economic loss, and fourth, the wrongful 
act has to be a proximate cause of the loss. The conditions are generally recognized in legal 
literature and can be deduced from articles 401 and 53 in the Civil Code, as well as article 71 in the 
JSC Act and article 44 in the LLC Act.194  
 
Besides the aforementioned mentioned default liability provisions of the Civil Code, Russian civil 
legislation contains numerous special provisions regulating liability. Some of these are set out in 
separate federal acts while others are in the Civil Code.195  The type of liability stated by the 
provision depends on its interpretation.  For example, if the provision says nothing, it will be fault-
based by default, due to article 401. The regulations in the Civil Code typically serve as general 
rules that supplement the special federal acts (cf. section 3.2). This somewhat resembles the 
situation in Norway in the way that customary rules supplement the content of the codified liability 
basis (see the former passage).  
 
The relations between the general liability regulation in the Civil Code and the special liability bases 
imply that the latter cannot be interpreted in isolation, but must be interpreted in light of, and 
supplemented by, the general provisions of the Civil Code. In contractual relationships, this applies 
in particular with regard to article 401. With regard to company relations, article 53, section 3 in the 
Civil Code states liability for those who act in the name of a company, regardless of the type of 
company, if they were not acting reasonably or in good faith according to the interests of the 
company.196 Thus, this article must be interpreted in light of, and supplemented by, the general rule 
of article 401, since the latter regulates all contractual relationships in general, and article 53 does 
not exclude the application of article 401. In this regard, an action that is not committed in good 
faith, reasonably and not in the interests of the company would constitute a wrongful act. 
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Additionally, there is the condition of negligence, pursuant to article 401. Finally, there are the 
conditions of the presence of an economic loss proximately caused by the wrongful act. The same 
system applies to other special bases that are provided for in other federal acts. With regard to the 
executive, there will are a number of special legal bases in various federal acts. The most far 
reaching and general liability basis amongst the latter are article 71 of the JSC Act and article 44 of 
the LLC Act. The special legal bases in article 71 and article 44 must then be interpreted in 
accordance with article 401 and 53.197 This is due to the fact that article 53 has the same scope as 
articles 71 and 44, and in this way, supplements the latter two articles. Since articles 71 and 44 name 
“negligence” as a condition for claiming damages and article 401 provides a definition of 
negligence, that definition applies to articles 71 and 44 as well. Some confusion may arise since the 
wording of the articles is identical in certain sections.  For example, the duties or obligations of 
acting reasonably, in good faith and in the interest of the company in article 53 have almost the same 
wording as in articles 71 and 44. Additionally, article 53 does not provide anything supplementary 
to articles 71 and 44 besides covering additional company types that than the JSC and LLC). Such 
overlap may seem awkward, but the Civil Code articles are intended to be general and 
supplemental.198 Thus, the claim for damages is based on the most special applicable legal base. If 
the claim for damages is based on a violation by an executive in a JSC for not acting reasonably, in 
good faith and in the interests of the company, the claimant should base the claim for damages on 
the liability basis in article 71 of the JSC Act.199 
 
The following provides a closer examination of these general conditions in a fault-based liability 
claim, as these supplement specific liability bases, like articles 71 and 44. However, the economic 
loss and proximate cause are only discussed in relation to articles 71 and 44, in sections 9 and 10. 
Some of the general viewpoints presented here will apply to other basis for liability, as well. In 
section 7, articles 71 and 44 will be discussed as a legal basis of liability for the executive body. In 
section 8, other legal basis will be touched upon to give the reader a clearer picture of questions 
concerning liability for executives. 
                                                 
197
 P. 3, in Makovskaya A  A,  Basis and Size for Liability when Managers Cause Losses to the Company (Основание и 
размер Ответственности руковадителей акцюнерного обшества за причиненные обшеству убытки), in: Article 
Collection: Restoring Losses and its Practice (Rozhkova M A ed) (Убытки и практика их возмещения: Сборник 
статей), Statut, 2006 (hereinafter Makovskaya). The article discusses the relationship between article 401 and articles 71 
and 44. 
198
 It may be questioned whether it is apt to have general liability rules, especially concerning managers, in the Civil 
Code when the specific federal acts on different types of legal entities also contains such provisions. 
199
 In many of the cases that were reviewed by the author, the claimant based his claim on both article 53 and 71 or 44, 
which did not provoke any comments from the court. 
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6.2.1 Wrongful act 
A condition for being liable is that the defendant acted wrongfully. Article 401, section 1, stipulates 
that if one does not act in accordance with his obligation, then he becomes liable.200 A wrongful act 
or breach of one’s obligations is a violation of legal norms in the form of statutory law, contractual 
provisions or the breach of more abstract legal norms, which is “contrary to the sense of justice”.201  
 
With regard to the executive, such obligations may be derived from the legislation and the contract. 
First, there are compulsory and facultative provisions in federal and regional acts, such as tax 
regulations or other public legislation that the executive is responsible for complying with on behalf 
of the company. Second, there are contractual provisions stipulated in the labor contract, which is 
the commercial contract of the executive body in a managing company, and adherent legal norms 
like internal company documents such as the articles of association, instructions from the board of 
directors (BD) and the memorandum of association.202  
 
In order to claim damages, there must be a liability basis that stipulates liability for the wrongful act 
in question.  For example, these special legal bases stipulate certain obligations, of which, a breach 
would constitute a wrongful act.  Far-reaching obligations are stipulated in articles 71 and 44. 
Another example of a special liability basis is article 11 in the “Act on Commercial Secrets”, which 
indicates liability if a commercial secret is exposed by a manager (see section 8.1.6 for a discussion 
of this liability base). 
 
6.2.2 Negligence 
In order to be liable, the wrongful act must have been committed negligently. Article 401, section 1, 
in the Civil Code states that if one does “not act in accordance with one’s obligations; he becomes 
liable by presence of negligence”.203 The article provides a general characterization and 
interpretation of the negligent condition by negatively defining it as the following:  “a person is not 
                                                 
200
 “Лицо, не исполнившее обязательства либо исполнившее его ненадлежащим образом, несет ответственность 
(…)” 
201
 Sukhanov, p. 600.  
202
 Article 69, section 3, subsection 2 in the JSC Act lists similar obligations to comply with for the executive. 
203
 ”Лицо, не исполнившее обязательства либо исполнившее его ненадлежащим образом, несет ответственность 
при наличии вины” 
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negligent, if the proper degree of “care”204 and “diligence”205 that was expected of him due to the 
character of the contract and the business conditions was present, and he undertook all necessary 
measures for ensuring a proper fulfillment of the contract.206 “Negligence”, in article 401, includes 
the simple negligence standard, gross negligence and intention.207 
 
As a matter of Russian law, an objective conception of negligence is applied.208 This conception 
depends on whether or not the defendant’s conduct corresponds to an objective negligent action, 
regardless of his internal or subjective comprehension of the conduct. As Sergeeva states, “the 
internal approach may only be judged upon examination of his actions and whether the requisite 
carefulness and diligence are absent”.209 Sykhanov states that the actions of the defendant are not to 
be compared to an abstract “bonus pater” person, but to “the concrete circumstances, including the 
character of the obligations that he is incumbent with and the conditions of business,210 wherein the 
requirements of care and diligence have their source.”211 
 
6.2.3 Economic loss and causality 
The sufferer must present an economic loss to be considered a claimant. There are general and 
default provisions in the Civil Code that regulate economic losses that apply to all bases of liability 
when nothing else is stipulated, namely article 15 and, if the liability originates from a contractual 
relationship, article 393.  
                                                 
204
 “заботливость”. “omsorg”. 
205
 “осмотрительность”. Black, et al, p. 11 apply the translation “discretion” (in Norwegian: 
“varsomhet”/“skjønnsomhet”/“oppmerksomhet”). 
206
 ”Лицо признается невиновным, если при той степени заботливости и осмотрительности, какая от него 
требовалась по характеру обязательства и условиям оборота, оно приняло все меры для надлежащего 
исполнения обязательства.” 
207
 The article only states negligence, but it is generally acknowledged that negligence refers to both gross and simple 
negligence. See e.g. Sadikov, to article 401.  
208
 See e.g. Sukhanov, p. 608 and Telyokina’s commentary to article 71, in Telyokina M V, Commentaries to the 
Federal Act on “Joint Stock Companies” (Федеральный закон от 26 декабря 1995 г. N 208-ФЗ “Об акционерных 
обществах”), Moscow, Wolters Kluver 2005 (this book is provided by Garant database, which did not provide 
pagination for this book, therefore only articles are referred to here); Traditionally under Russian law, two different 
approaches existed in order to state negligence. First, there is the classic subjective approach in the criminal law, 
whereto the negligence is to be judged on the defendant’s subjective and psychological comprehension of his actions 
and the consequences of his actions. Second, there is the objective approach, which does not consider the defendant’s 
subjective relations to his actions, only his conduct. See further in e.g. Makovskaya, pp. 9-10.  
209
 Pp. 674-675, in Seergev Yu K, et al., Civil Act: Textbook (Гражданское право: Учебник) vol 1, 6th edition, 
Moscow, TK Velbi  (ТК Велби) Publishing House, 2002 (hereinafter, Sergeeva). 
210
 “условы оборота” literally, this is translated with “conditions for turnover”. A more apt translation is “conditions of 
business”. According to various dictionaries, there are several slightly differentl translations involving these words in 
combination, e,g. “business custom”; “vilkår for omsetning” (literally). 
211
 Sukhanov, p. 608. 
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A closer definition of the “cause” condition is not provided for in the Civil Code, but is a generally 
acknowledged condition (see section 10). The conditions may as well be deduced from the special 
liability bases. For instance, articles 71 and 44 state that the executive “bears liability vis-à-vis the 
company for losses caused by the negligent action [author’s italic]”.212 The proximity assessment 
depends on the concrete assessment by the court. 
                                                 
212




7 Claims for damages based of articles 71 and 44  
7.1 Introduction to the articles 
In this section, the liability bases in articles 71 and 44 are discussed. The focus is on the obligations 
these articles stipulate. A violation of these constitutes a wrongful act. Furthermore, the focus is on 
the negligent condition that these articles stipulate. As indicated in this section, the assessments of 
the wrongful act condition and the negligent condition are somewhat intertwined under these 
articles.  
 
The articles stipulate three widely formulated obligations/duties (hereinafter referred to as “the 
Duties”). This wide formulation makes the articles the most practical and wide liability bases with 
regard to executives, and potentially covers almost every form of misuse of the executive’s position 
and negligent conduct of business operations.  
 
The Duties that are imposed in the first section of article 71 goes as follows: 
The executive, “(…) when performing his rights and fulfills his obligations, he has 
to act in the interests of the company, and perform his rights and obligations in 
relation to the company with reasonableness and good faith”.213 
 
Article 44 states the same with slightly different wording: 
The executive “(…) by performing his rights and fulfillment of his obligations, he 
has to act in the interests of the company reasonably and in good faith”.214 
 
The slightly different wording in the articles does not reveal any substantial differences.215 
 
If the Duties are violated, the consequences are stipulated in a similar manner in both of the articles’ 
second sections: 
                                                 
213
 (…) при осуществлении своих прав и исполнении обязанностей должны действовать в интересах общества, 
осуществлять свои права и исполнять обязанности в отношении общества добросовестно и разумно”. 
214
 ”(…) при осуществлении ими прав и исполнении обязанностей должны действовать в интересах общества 
добросовестно и разумно”. 
215
 Despite the slightly different wording, the literature does not distinguish between the articles, and they are regarded 
to be similar, as the concept of the Duties will nevertheless be the same. (see e.g. Makovskaya, Makarova, Molotnikov). 
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The executive “(…) bears liability vis-à-vis the company for losses caused upon the 
company by his negligent acting (omission).”216  
 
As is apparent, the wording in the first sections of the articles has a wide range of potential 
application. The second sections ensure that the shareholder has a remedy for restoration, which 
motivates the executive to act accordingly to the Duties.  
 
The Duties stipulated in articles 71 and 44 are based on the Anglo-American legal concept of 
fiduciary duties (or fiduciary obligations).217 In Anglo-American law, fiduciary duties are widely 
recognized as the duties to act in the best interest of another party. The fiduciary duties are often 
expressed as, inter alia, the duty to act with loyalty and the duty to act with care. For instance, a 
corporation’s board member has a fiduciary duty to shareholders, and a trustee has a fiduciary duty 
to the trust’s beneficiaries, etc.218 A breach of such duties results in liability for the wrongdoer if the 
conditions of causality and loss are present, as well.  This term has been linguistically adapted to 
Russian legal literature as “Фидуциры”, and the concept is discussed in Russian legal literature with 
regard to the duty of the executive to act reasonably, in the interest of the company and in good 
faith.219 In legal literature, the duty of acting in the interests of the company is often referred to as the 
duty of loyalty or the principle of loyalty.220 
 
7.1.1 The Business Judgment Rule 
The concept of the business judgment rule is developed in American court practice 
and plays a major role in the assessment of executives’ liability in claims for 
damages. It should be noted that this rule has no legal basis in Russia and is not 
applied by the courts.
221
 The rule has been applied in American courts partly to 
protect the manager’s willingness to take economic risks and partly due to the fact 
that the courts often tend to lack expertise in business matters.
222
  The rule stipulates 
that the court should presume that “decisions adopted by company managers are 
                                                 
216
 ”(…) несут ответственность перед обществом за убытки, причиненные обществу их виновными действиями 
(бездействием),” 
217
 Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, p. 57; Makarova, heading 4, section 5, subsection 7. 
218
 For a brief definition of this term in the US, see e.g. http://definitions.uslegal.com/c/civil-causes-of-action-breach-of-
fiduciary-duty/ or http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/fiduciary+duty. 
219
 ”действовать в интересах общества добросовестно и разумно”. 
220
 See for instance, Molotnikov, p. 172 et seq 
221
 See e.g. p. 4 in Ivanov I, Teselkin F, Legal Liability for Managers in Russian Companies (Юридическая 
ответственность руководителей российских компаний), in: “Corporate Lawyer” (Корпоративный юрист), no 4, 
2005 (hereinafter Ivanov and Teselkin).  
222
 See definition in n 10 for the term “manager”. 
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reasonable, as long as the decisions were taken with adequate information and 
without any self-interest”,223 when assessing the negligence of the executive. There 
has been some discussion of whether it should be introduced such a rule in Russian 
legislation,
224
 but so far it has not gained support. From the author’s point of view, 
one argument in this discussion against an introduction of such a rule in Russian law 
is the fact that a high threshold for affirming a claim for damages, hence the 
safeguard of the willingness to take risks, is already present. 
 
7.2 Do articles 71 and 44 derogate in favor of contracts or other federal acts?  
The first question is whether the facultative provision in article 53 of the Civil Code turn articles 71 
and 44 into facultative provisions as well. Article 53, section 2 in the Civil Code states that the 
article is facultative and derogates if other federal acts or agreements stipulate otherwise. Thus, 
article 3, section 2 in the Civil Code, which stipulates precedent to provisions in the Civil Code in 
cases of contradictions between the Code and other acts, does not apply. In this manner, article 53 
yields precedent to the provisions in articles 71 and 44.225 The same conclusion derives from the Lex 
Specialis Principle.  
 
Moreover, articles 71 and 44 state that the executive is liable inasmuch no other legal bases are 
provided by other federal acts, without mentioning contracts. Due to an antithetic interpretation, this 
implies that articles 71 and 44 are not facultative. Therefore, the liability may not be limited by 
agreements on a contractual basis.226  
 
Concerning the derogation in favor of other federal acts, a suggestion could be that articles 71 and 
44 derogate if the plaintiff pleads another special liability base in addition to articles 71 and 44 when 
claiming for damages. Ivanov suggests that this could be the regulation on liability in the Labor 
Code insofar that such basis is also asserted in the claim.227 The author was unable to find further 
elaborations on this matter. 
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 Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, p. 401. 
224
 See eg Makovskaya, pp. 17-18 and, p. 29 in Chanturiya L, Civil Liability for Managers in Joint Stock Companies 
(Гражданско-правая ответственность руковадителей акцюнерных обшествах), in: “Corporate Lawyer” 
(Корпоративный юрист), no. 2, pp. 25-30, 2007 (hereinafter,Chanturiya). 
225
 See e.g. Ivanov 1998, p. 101. 
226
 This is generally acknowledged as well. See eg Molotnikov pp. 161-162, Sadikov, article 53, Abovoy, article 53. 
227
 Ivanov 1998, p. 101. 
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7.3 The duties of loyalty, acting in good faith and with reasonableness – one overall 
duty? 
Articles 71 and 44 stipulate three obligations (“the Duties”), which may be assessed together as one 
duty, or as two or three separate duties. Most of the Russian literature treats it as two duties, one as 
the duty of loyalty, and the other as the duty of acting in good faith and with reasonableness.228 In 
order to be liable, however, the Duties as a whole must be violated, since all of the Duties are 
intertwined.229 For instance, an action of the executive may turn out to be bad the company, but the 
action was still performed in good faith and with reasonability. In this case he is not liable. For the 
claimant, this delimitation does not necessary play a big role, as he will plead that the Duties as a 
whole are violated. 
 
In comparison with Anglo-American law, in which the principle of care/the duty of care is an 
essential part of the fiduciary duties, this duty is not directly provided for in articles 71 and 44. As 
Black, Kraakman and Tarassova point out, however, the duty of care in common law systems is 
referred to as acting with reasonableness in article 71. 230  
 
It is doubtful that the categorization will have any impact on the practical application of the Duties. 
The categorization of the three stipulated obligations is of a more theoretical interest. As apparent 
when examining the discussions of liability based on articles 71 and 44, this has not been a matter of 
concern. 
 
7.4 Norwegian parallel to the fiduciary duties in articles 71 and 44 
The customary law of a general fault-based liability for company managers in companies has been 
codified in Norwegian company legislation. Today, liability vis-à-vis the company and its 
shareholders are regulated by articles 17-1 in the JSC Act (“allmennaksjeselskapsloven”) and the 
LLC Act (“aksjeselskapsloven”). The term fiduciary duties is unknown in Norwegian law and the 
assessment under articles 17-1 refers only to the standard of negligence and does not stipulate any 
duties or conditions for the presence of a wrongful act. The assessment depends on a general and 
                                                 
228
 Black, Kraakman and Tarassova compare and put on a par the duty of acting in good faith and in interest of the 
company to the duty of loyalty in common law systems (Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, p. 401). 
229
 E.g., Ivanov 1998, p. 98 and Molotnikov, p. 172 et seq. Both assert that these obligations are interconnected in the 
way that a violation of one of them may be reckoned as a violation of all as a whole.  
230
 Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, p. 400. 
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overall assessment of whether or not the executive is liable. However, as mentioned in section 6.1, 
this assessment may be divided into two questions.  The first relates to whether the conduct that 
resulted in the loss was due to an objective wrongdoing.  This implies a violation of some sort of 
legal acts in broad sense, such as provisions in statutory acts, articles of association or customary 
acknowledged general principles like the duty to act with loyalty in contractual relationships.231 The 
presence of such a wrongful act is, albeit, not an absolute condition. The second question concerns 
subjective elements, such as the degree of intention and the question of whether or not any 
excusable factual or legal delusions made the wrongdoer initiate the harmful conduct.232 Closer 
elaborations of these questions and the negligence standard are further elaborated through custom. 
As the rule in article 17-1 in the respective acts is of a more general and vague nature, one might 
observe that the liability basis for executives in articles 71 and 44 are more explicitly expressed. 
However, the stipulation of the Duties sets forth vague standards, and their relations to a vague 
negligence standard may cause confusion. This is discussed in further detail in the next section. 
 
7.5 The assessments of the Duties in connection with the negligence assessment  
A violation of the Duties on the basis of articles 71 and 44, which constitutes a wrongful act, will 
not lead to liability if the executive was not negligent, according to sections 2 of the articles. Article 
401 elaborates the further signification of negligence. Section 1 of the article states that if the 
wrongdoer showed a sufficient degree of care and diligence, taking into account the character of the 
obligations and business conditions, he is not negligent (cf. section 6.1.2). Just as conspicuous as 
this reference, the legislation on this matter sets forth various general standards. A main question 
that arises in this regard is how an assessment of care and diligence differs from an assessment of 
the obligations to act in good faith and with reasonableness. A good faith assessment will, as the 
term indicates, rest upon whether an act was done with good intentions or with bad intentions. 
Bearing in mind that “intention” is a form of negligence (since negligence includes simple 
negligence, gross negligence and intention), the good faith assessment and the negligence 
assessment will be the same assessment. Furthermore, assessing reasonability and negligence 
separately also constitutes an overlapping assessment, as it is hard to imagine that an executive can 
act unreasonably on one hand (so the wrongful act condition is met), but on the other hand not 
acting negligently (so the negligence condition is not met). Thus, if one assesses a breach of the 
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 See eg Aarum, p. 349. 
232
 Aarum p. 189; Perland, p. 127. 
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Duties in articles 71 and 44, this also encompasses the negligence assessment, despite the fact that it 
is in principle two different conditions that are to be assessed separately (cf. section 6). 
 
As early as inn 1998, Ivanov stated that violating the duty of good faith and reasonableness 
automatically results in declaring the action as negligent.233 Additionally, he substantiates this with 
suggesting that the Duties define the degree of care and diligence (terms used to describe negligence 
in article 401) according to the size and character of the executive’s duties.234 Makovskaya adheres 
to the point of view that a violation of the Duties results in declaring the actions as negligent. She 
adds that it is “odd” that the legislature uses the terms “care and diligence“ in article 401 to describe 
the requirements for not acting negligently when this does not differs from the terms of acting 
reasonable and in good faith.235 In this way, the assessments of whether the wrongful act condition 
and the negligence condition are satisfied are largely left to an overall and concrete assessment.236 
Or, as Makovskaya formulates it, the violations of these duties are to be perceived “through the 
prism of negligence”.237 
 
In comparison, in the US is the negligence condition as such not a separate condition, but more of an 
overall feature in the fiduciary duties. For instance, the duty of care for directors will be considered 
violated if the director showed gross negligence (see e.g. the well-known case In re The Walt Disney 
Company Derivative Litigation of Delaware Supreme Court, no. 411, 2005).  If the duty is violated, 
in addition to the presence of causation and economical loss, the director becomes liable. 
 
To further complicate this picture, articles 71 and 44, in section 3 respectively, states that when 
assessing “the basis of liability and its size”, the “business turnover and other circumstances that are 
connected to the case” should be taken into account.238 As Makovskaya points out, the assessment of 
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 Ivanov 1998, p. 99 with further references in support of this statement; See also Chanturiya, pp. 28-29, arguing for 
this comprehension of the provision; See e.g. SAC Resolution 22 May 2007 N 871/07 that merges these assessments. 
234
 Ivanov 1998, p. 99. 
235
 Makovskaya, p. 15. 
236
 The author’s own impression while examining the literature on the subject-matter. E.g., Molotnikov treats the Duties 
independently of the four conditions, Shitkina, Makarova and others do not comment on the problem. Makovskaya does 
examine the problem and principally attaches the assessment of good faith and reasonableness to the negligence 
condition. 
237
 Makovskaya, p. 10; Despite the fact that the relationship or delimitation between the wrongful act and negligence 
with regard to the Duties is not clarified, the Russian legal literature has not to an extensive degree discussed these more 
theoretical difficulties. Nevertheless, not discussing this particular problem, the legal literature provides to some degree 
a mapping of the content of the Duties and the assessment of liability based on articles 71 and 44.  
238
 “ При определении оснований и размера ответственности (…)должны быть приняты во внимание  
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business turnover and other circumstances are already incorporated into the definition of negligence 
in article 401 in the Civil Code, and thus, it is hard to see how this provision can independently 
influence the assessment of the liability conditions under articles 71 and 44.239 It would be more 
likely to perceive the motives in section 3 as already included in the assessment of either the 
reasonableness or negligence. Thus, it is unclear whether this provision has any independent 
significance. Nevertheless, in Supreme Arbitrazjniy Court (SAC) Resolution of 22 May 2007 N 
871/07 (the case is also examined in section 7.6) it is stated that this provision allows for taking 
concrete circumstances into consideration. Nonetheless, it is clear that concrete circumstances still 
play a significant role in the liability assessment. Since the provision refers to “the size” of the loss, 
the provision may be intended for, and applied under, the assessment of the size of the losses under 
the economic loss condition (for more information on this question, see section 9).Taking into 
consideration the above discussion, an assessment of the liability question is often conducted in the 
following manner:  
The company or shareholder claims damages on the grounds that the executive entered a deal in bad 
faith, which was not in the interests of the company. For example, he concluded a purchase of over-
priced goods for the company. The first assessment is typically on whether or not the deal was in the 
interest of the company.240  If there are no special circumstances, such as a favorable redemption 
right adhered to in the contract, an over-priced purchase would not be in the interest of the company. 
However, this alone is not sufficient to constitute a wrongful act. The presence of the latter rests 
upon an assessment of whether this deal was concluded in bad faith (i.e. the executive concluded the 
deal without caring for the interests of the company), and/or if it was reasonable for the executive to 
enter from an objective point of view. If the court finds that the non-favorable deal was entered 
without reasonableness or good faith, the wrongful act condition is satisfied. Subsequently, the 
negligence condition is to be assessed. However, the executive will be assessed negligent, as well 
when his action is considered in bad faith and not reasonable.241 Additionally, when assessing the 
reasonableness, good faith requirements and negligence, the court can take into account concrete 
circumstances, as pointed out both in section 3 of the article and in section 1, subsection 2 of article 
401.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
обычные условия делового оборота и иные обстоятельства, имеющие значение для дела”; ”allminnelige 
forretningsomstendigheter for omsetning og andre forhold som har tilknytning til saken”. 
239
 Makovskaya, pp. 20-22. 
240
 Ivanov 1999, pp. 2-3. 
241
 Ivanov 1999, p. 9. 
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7.5.1 The problem of applying vague standards  
Inasmuch as the concepts of “good faith”, “reasonableness”, “care”, “diligence” and others are not 
defined in the legislation, the starting point for interpretation is the standard everyday meaning.242 
When the terms remain vague after an interpretation based on standard everyday meaning, it is left 
to practice to present a more detailed picture of the content of the standards, as is the case in most 
Western legislations.243 
 
However, with various categories of standards to be assessed under the partially overlapping 
wrongful act condition and the negligence condition, this may lead to confusion in practice. This is 
especially the case considering that Russian courts lack fundamental concepts of business law and 
the understandings of open and vaguely defined standards in the civil legislation.244 Courts often 
confuse the standards set forth by the obligations in articles 71 and 44 with that of negligence.245 
Black, Kraakman and Tarassova also admit that fiduciary duties are unlikely to play a significant 
role in the near term, but emphasize that in the long-term broad fiduciary standards may “… foster a 
managerial culture of duty to shareholders.”246 Still, as the following will suggest, this long-term 
effect has not yet come into full effect. It is debatable that the choice to apply vague standards in 
addition to the negligence condition with regard to the liability regulation of managers was unwise, 
as it breaks from the idea of “self enforcing” legislation and bright-line formulated rules (see section 
3.1).247 
 
7.6 Examples  of the court’s approach to assessing articles 71 and 44 and the Duties.  
Most court practice shows a rather negative stand with regard to affirming liability for the executive. 
The examples below are chosen on the basis of how clearly the application of the conditions was 
expressed in the decision.248 
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 See Braginskiy and Vitryanskiy, Contract Law (Договорное право), vol 1, Statut Press, 2000. 
243
 Ivanov 1999, p. 1. Ivanov, as most Russian authors, adheres to the view that court practice can be used as a source of 
law that provides elaborations on vague statutory provisions (cf. 2.4.1). 
244
 Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, p. 30.  
245
 Black, et al, p. 240. 
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 L.c.; See also ibid, p. 57 and p. 401. 
247
 Wolk, p. 231, criticizes the vague standards in the question of liability for executives.  
248
 Cf. n 20; The following in sections 7.6 to 7.8 shows that there are central questions with regard to the liability 
assessment under articles 44 and 71 that is poorly commented upon in court practice. This is mostly due to the fact that 
the hearing is for the large part concentrated on the evidences of the claimant rather the nuances of the law, see e.g. 
Efeev p 7 (cf. section 5.3.1). 
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In SAC Resolution 22 May 2007 N 871/07, a stockholder249 filed a lawsuit against the executive 
based on article 71 in the Act on JSC. The stockholder asserted that the executive had not settled a 
legitimate claim from a third party after a lengthy period of time had passed.  As a result, the third 
party took legal actions for the settlement and the company incurred additional court expenses. As 
the additional court expenses were only due to the executive’s reluctance to settle a legitimate claim 
from a third party, the stockholder claimed that this was not reasonable and not in the interests of the 
company. After presenting the case, the court referred the legal basis in article 71, section 2 and 
stated that when assessing the size and basis of liability, the business custom and other relevant 
circumstances must be taken into account, pursuant to section 3. Unfortunately, without further 
elaborating the reference to section 3. Moreover, the court merged the negligence condition with the 
duty of acting in good faith and with reasonableness, stating that these duties prescribe an 
assessment on whether the executive showed care and diligence and applied all measures for 
fulfilling his obligations (which is the definition of negligence in article 401). After this, the court 
referred to article 65 APC, which states that the claimant must prove everything he refers to, like 
actual losses and their size, the wrongful act of the executive and causality between the loss and the 
wrongful act. Moreover, the court determined that it is not negligent acting by the executive to 
inflict court expenses on the company. Furthermore, the court elaborated that in this case, the lower 
court that had satisfied the claim in this case did not sufficiently assess the concrete circumstances 
for how the third party’s claim arose in the first place and the financial position of the company at 
the moment when the court expenses were due. Thus, the former decisions were overruled and the 
executive found not liable. As such, the court emphasizes the importance of concrete circumstances 
under an assessment of the Duties.  
 
In the case Regional Federal Arbitrazjniy Court (FAC) Moscow District 31 May 2005 no. KG-
A40/4395-05, the claimant asserted that a deal made by the executive concerning a sale of real estate 
belonging to the company caused losses for the company in violation of article 71 in the JSC Act. 
The claimant asserted that the sale-price was 5,545,000 rubles under market price. The court did not 
consider this to be a violation of the executive’s Duties since the market price only had a “supposed 
character”250 and that a sale of assets should not be considered a violation of the Duties just because 
there was a gap between the contractual fixed price and the market price. In this way, the ruling 
shows a lack of understanding when it comes to the duty of acting in the interests of the company. 
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First, the under-price was clearly not in the interests of the company. Second, the court even in a 
general manner asserted that the market price had only “supposed character, even though there were 
no other facts (at least in the case abstract) that could reasonably explain the sub-market price from 
the sale. 
 
In the case of FAC Moscow District 23 May 2005, no A40-15557/05-1344-102, the claimant 
asserted that the executive did not exploit the opportunity for renting out a real estate property 
belonging to the company. The court stated that as an “independent economic subject, the company 
is free to consider what it wants to do with its assets in order to achieve income”. Thus, the 
shareholder’s claim that the renunciation of renting the property was unprofitable did not lead to 
approbation, despite the fact that no other heavy evidence in favor of the executive was presented. 
Unfortunately, the court did not comment on where to set the limits for the “free consideration” 
before it constitutes a breach of the Duties, thus leaving a considerable leeway for the executive. 
 
In FAC Ural district 27 July 2007, N F09-4914/07-C4, a company claimed damages against its 
former executive. While serving as executive, the defendant also served as an executive at a 
competing company.  He entered into a deal between the two companies since both were rendering 
renovation work services of offices. The plaintiff asserted that the deal caused the company a loss, 
as it favored the second company, and that the executive was acting with self interest, which violates 
the Act on LLC article 44. The second company was brought into the case as a third party, pursuant 
to article 46 APC. After presenting the evidence, the claim and the procedure in the lower instances, 
the court concluded that the material presented by the claimant did not prove a loss for the company 
and did not prove negligence or a violation of the Duties by the defendant. Then the court 
emphasized that the claimant must prove what he based the claim on, pursuant to article 65 in the 
APC. Furthermore, the court was not convinced that the deal was done at reduced prices and then 
stated that there are no limitations in the legislation to sell one’s assets at reduced prices. Thus, the 
ruling shows that the threshold for proving the claim is high. When the court states that there is no 
limitation in the legislation to sell one’s goods at the reduced price, it again indicates a lack of 
understanding of the obligation to act in the interests of the company.  
 
Some cases show that it is easier to get the claim for damages affirmed if the loss refers to a deal 
made by the executive that is already stated by the court as invalid. The case FAC North-Caucasian 
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District 27 Mai 2003 F08-1555/2003 is indicative of this approach. In an earlier court decision, the 
court deemed a deal made by the executive as invalid by pro forma. Since it was pro forma, the 
executive was deemed to have acted in bad faith by the court. As the deal was not in the interest of 
the company either, hence, he violated article 44 in the LLC Act and the losses stemming from the 
invalid deal could be claimed. The court did not comment upon the reasonability duty. 
 
Furthermore, in practice, there have been cases in which executives have sold assets without 
involving an impartial appraiser of the assets. This is an important aspect due to the fact that one of 
the problems with the misuse of company assets relates to the sale or purchase of goods and services 
for either too low or too high of a price. If it is a requirement by statutory law to have the price fixed 
by an impartial appraiser, non-fulfillment of this would most likely constitute a violation of the 
Duties (see section 7.7.5).251 If this is not required by the statutory provision, it depends on a 
concrete assessment of whether or not involving an appraiser constitutes a violation of the Duties. 
Typical elements of the assessment include the executive’s own knowledge or access to satisfactory 
knowledge (e.g. from his staff), if the market price is well known already, etc.252 In FAC Moscow 
District’s Resolution 19 February 2002, no N KG-A40/547-02, the CEO253 in OAO 
“Beskudnikovskiy kombinat stroitelnix materialov” had sold company real estate to ZAO “Firma 
Poisk” for the price of 200,000 rubles. An appraiser, OOO “Price Inform”, estimated in the court 
hearing that the value was 800,000 rubles. The lower instances had concluded with that this was a 
violation of article 71, and that such a violation would allow the contract to be declared invalid on 
basis of article 168 in the Civil Code.  The article states that a contract not in accordance with the 
law, in this case article 71, is invalid. Obviously, one cannot claim a deal is invalid while at the same 
time claiming damages that are due to the consequences of this invalid deal, as it would as if it was 
valid (however, claiming invalidation along with damages that incurred in order to put the parties in 
a position as the deal was never concluded invalid deal incurred is naturally allowed). In this way, 
the lower court confused the conditions for invalidation with the conditions for claiming damages. 
The higher court affirmed, however, that the sale was indeed a violation of article 71, as such a deal 
could not “safeguard the interests of the company”. However, such a violation does not make it a 
base for declaring the contract void under article 168. In this way, the higher court cleared up the 
mistake by the lower instance, but this also revealed the first instance’s lack of understanding of the 
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relations between fundamental concepts like liability and invalidation. It also shows that an 
appraiser may play a significant role when determine whether or not a sale or purchase is in the 
interests of the company, despite FAC Moscow District 31 May 2005 no. KG-A40/4395-05 
statement about the “supposed character” of the market price. 
 
Overall, the cases show that the threshold for getting a claim affirmed is indeed high. Especially 
worrying is how some courts have granted the executive too much latitude when the deals that were 
concluded obviously were not in the interest of the company.254 
 
7.7 The assessment under the Duties  
7.7.1 Acts with recommending character, the Code of Corporate Governance  
The question here concerns whether acts with only recommending character, i.e. not binding legal 
acts, provide guidelines when assessing the content of the Duties. 
 
In corporate legislation among Western countries, recommended but non-binding regulations are 
widespread.255 In Russia, a Code for Corporate Governance was elaborated in 2002 by the Federal 
Commission on Securities,256 based on the OECD’s “Principles for Corporate Government”, and 
adopted on the Ministry Session, 26 - 27 May 1999. The Code concerns, inter alia, a range of 
questions regarding liability for managers and provides concrete obligations (e.g. establishment of 
procedures to disclose company information to shareholders) for the executive. More general 
statements of the content of the Duties are also provided for. For example, heading 4, section 3.1.1, 
states that the executive must show the necessary care and diligence that is expected of good 
managers in similar situations and circumstances.  
 
It was recommended by the Commission to adopt the Code in the internal documents of the 
company,257 but so far it has not achieved any widespread adoption in Russia. Several authors assert 
that the code still casts some light on the content of the Duties, since the code provides 
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recommended obligations for managers.258 Thus, inasmuch as the provisions are well-considered and 
balanced, they may serve as guidelines, offering a mapping of the standard of the Duties.  
 
Even though the Code is facultative, it is debatable that the standards postulate positivistic aspects of 
the content of the Duties. For instance, under Norwegian contract law, it is generally recognized that 
well balanced guidelines that are worked out by organizations in a business sphere may be given 
significant importance when evaluating standards, regardless of whether the guidelines have been 
accepted by the parties or not. However, as far as the author has reviewed court practice, the 
application of these norms has not been given sufficient weight when interpreting the principles. Not 
acting in accordance with the Code will nevertheless constitute an argument in favor of establishing 
liability.259  
 
Another form of guidelines is provided with reference to business custom. According to section 3 in 
articles 71 and 44, section 3 in the Acts on JSC and LLC, business custom should be taken into 
account in the assessment of liability. Moreover, one might argue that the Code of Good 
Governance is a business custom and thus must be taken into consideration due to the 
aforementioned articles. Generally, article 5 of the Civil Code defines that a business custom is a 
well established and widely applied conduct (insofar it is not contradicting legal norms). It is 
doubtful whether the Code of Good Governance would qualify as a business custom based on article 
5. However, other good practices concerning the performance of the executive, which at the same 
time is widespread among companies, may serve as guidelines under the assessment of articles 71 
and 44. 
 
7.7.2 Particularly about the duty of loyalty 
The following provides further details on the duty of loyalty and its relation to the interests of the 
company.260 First of all, the main purpose of establishing companies is to generate profit, according 
to article 50, section 1 in the Civil Code. Thus, the main duty of the executive is to generate profit 
for the company. This implies that the actions of the executive must serve long-term goals for 
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achieving stable income and avoiding hazardous risks.261 Second, this implies that the executive 
cannot pursue his private interests at the expense of the company.262  
 
An important aspect of the duty of loyalty is its duration. Ivanov states that the duty of loyalty 
should not be interpreted to be effective only for the time the executive is under contractual 
relationship with the company, but also after the executive has ended the relationship with the 
company.263 This is to safeguard non-disclosure of commercial secrets.  
 
When it comes to abuse of corporate funds, such activity mostly occurs in connection with the 
conclusion of contracts, wherein the executive possesses self-interest.264 Concluding a contract, in 
which the executive has a self-interest, may constitute a violation on the duty to act in the interests 
of the company.265 These situations are more extensively regulated by article 84 in the Act on JSC 
and article 45 in the LLC Act (and provide a special liability base, see section 8.1.5). Even though 
these articles specifically regulate the question of conflicting interest, there are no obstacles to base 
a claim from such a situation under articles 71 and 44, due to the latter’s wide scope. This may be 
especially practical when the factual circumstances are only loosely covered by articles 81-84. 
 
7.7.3 The question of liability when taking business risks 
It is generally acknowledged that taking normal business risks does not create liability for the 
executive.266 Karabelnikov states that risks taken within the frame of typical business risks will not 
be considered as a violation of the Duties. 267 He outlines typical business risks as the following: 1) 
when acting in accordance with contemporary knowledge and experience; 2) when the recognized 
goals of the company could not be reached by any other means than that which were taken; 3) when 
measures have been taken to prevent possible losses commensurate to the risks; and 4) when the 
object of the risk is of material value and it does not threaten the life and health of anyone.268 
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7.7.4 Individual circumstances with the executive 
Lack of qualifications, experience or knowledge does not mitigate the executive’s liability.269 If such 
deficiencies are present, the executive is negligent and/or unreasonable for accepting the role as an 
executive body without taking appropriate measures to overcome his lack of qualifications.270  
If it is objectively impossible for the executive to fulfill his obligations he is not liable.271 The same 
applies if the executive gets an acute illness.272 
 
7.7.5 The Duties with regard to violations of other statutory provisions and company 
documents 
Violation of concrete obligations that are derived from statutory provisions (e.g. violation of tax 
legislation, labor legislation or corruption), as well as direct violations of the articles of association 
or instructions made by the general meeting (GM) or (BD), constitute a wrongful act.273 When 
basing the claim for damages on articles 71 and 44, the wrongful act is not enough to constitute a 
violation of the Duties.274 When there has been a violation of concrete obligations, a concrete overall 
assessment must follow. This assessment determines if the executive acted reasonably, in good faith 
and in the interest of the company when the wrongful act occurred.275 As mentioned earlier, this 
assessment will coincide with the negligence assessment (see section 7.5). Only if this is confirmed, 
a violation of articles 71 and 44 has been committed.276  
 
A violation of concrete obligations will, however, usually lead to a violation of articles 71 and 44, as 
well. In principle, the articles are interpreted in a way that to act in accordance with the Duties 
implies not to act against the law, even if this benefits the company in the short term.277 This can be 
deduced logically from the Duties; if the executive is dealing with businesses on the edge of the law, 
it may be considered reasonable and in good faith vis-à-vis the company since he is seeking all 
possible means of income (additionally, such business may not result in any claimable losses). 
However, if the company is investigated by law-enforcement authorities, this would most probably 
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lead to losses for the company. A crack-down on the company by the authorities would almost never 
be in the interests of the company. Thus, taking such risks would be neither in the interests of the 
company nor reasonable. Hence, a violation of statutory law would constitute a violation of articles 
71 and 44.  
 
Nonetheless, the assessment provided for by the Duties ensures that minor violations are not 
automatically deemed as a violation of the Duties when the executive has “excusable” grounds for 
his actions. This is, albeit, limited to “force majeure” situations that force the executive to undertake 
a minor violation of company instructions or company legislation in the interests of the company. 
For instance, it is not a wrongful act if the shareholders do not get the invitation for the GM in time 
(as stipulated in the JSC and the LLC Act) due to technical problems at the company’s head office.  
This matter is clearly out of the executive’s control. Another possibility is that the executive 
postpones the GM in order to prepare the accounts for the GM, as they were delayed by the 
accountant. Numerous such instances may occur.  However, if the GM was postponed because the 
executive had not prepared it properly (e.g. the executive opposed items on the agenda and therefore 
deliberately delayed the GM, or the executive forgot to send the agenda to the accountant), this 
would represent a violation. Notably, such violations rarely result in provable economic losses for 
the company. Nonetheless, economic losses are not out of the question. For instance, The GM was 
supposed to merge the company with another one in order to gain needed financial resources. This 
decision had to be adopted within a certain limit so that the contractual partner did not withdraw 
from the merging plans due to excessive delays. If the executive manages to hinder the gathering of 
the GM, and thus prevents the merger, the company will likely suffer financial losses. 
 
Furthermore, several concrete obligations are laid out in the respective Acts on JSC and LLC, the 
articles of association, other internal corporate documents and the labor contract with the executive 
(or commercial contract with a managing company). Examples of such concrete obligations include 
the duty to organize the GM, pursuant to article 69, section 2, subsection 2 in the Act on JSC and 
article 34 stipulates a duty to summon the GM, while article 35, section 2, regulates the gathering of 
an extraordinary GM. Other obligations consist of keeping information available for the 
shareholders, which they have rightful access to at the office of the executive, pursuant to article 36, 
section 3 in the LLC Act and article 52, section 3, in the JSC Act. Article 89, section 2 in the JSC 
Act stipulates obligatory storage of a wide range of documents at the office of the executive body, 
 70 
which also carries out the storage and the presentation of it for stockholders on request, pursuant to 
article 91, section 1.278 The executive must conduct the protocol of the GM and distribute it among 
the shareholders on demand, pursuant only to the Act on LLC article 37, section 6. In a merger of 
companies, the elected executive is obliged to execute the registration of companies pursuant to 
article 52, section 4 in the LLC Act.279 The executive must fulfill the decisions made by the GM and 
the BD, pursuant article 69, section 2 in the JSC Act and article 40, section 4 in the LLC Act. Article 
69 in the JSC Act, section 3, subsection 4 states that the executive must not be involved in the 
management of other organizations without permission of the BD. It should be noted that in LLC, a 
similar provision is not provided for; thus a concrete assessment will be used to determine if holding 
a position in other companies is in conflict with acting in the “interest of the company”, pursuant to 
article 44, section 1.280  
 
In addition, concrete obligations may be derived from the executive’s competence. Besides the 
competence that is provided in the Acts, the company may have its own provisions on competence 
in the articles of association. Notably, violations of these obligations are unlikely to cause 
substantial losses for the company. 
 
7.7.5.1 Liability for correct information, accounts and bookkeeping – especially stipulated in the 
JSC Act 
Article 88 in the JSC Acts contains an obligation for the executive to maintain proper annual 
accounts, bookkeeping, financial statements and other information relating to the company’s 
operations in accordance with the JSC Act and other legal acts of the Russian Federation. This is, 
intern alia, a reference to that the bookkeeping must be in accordance with the Act on 
Bookkeeping,281 in addition to several acts adopted by federal bodies concerning accounts and 
bookkeeping.282 Further, it stipulates that this information should be duly presented to the 
stockholders.283 The second section in the article stipulates liability in case of non-compliance with 
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the present Act. This is a reference to article 71 in the Act.284 Thus, a violation of article 88 must also 
violate the Duties in order to establish liability for the executive on the basis of article 71. In this 
way, the stipulation of liability in article 88, section 2 does not play an independent role in the 
liability, since the question under article 71 remains the same; that is, whether  the violation of 
article 88 is undertaken in the interest of the company, in good faith and with reasonableness.  
 
7.7.5.2 Violation of the regulations of entering major transactions (крупная сделка) 
Articles 78 and 79 in the Act on JSC and article 46 in the Act on LLC set forth a special procedure 
when the company enters into major deals. The objective of this provision is to ensure shareholders’ 
control over major deals and the disposal of company assets. The articles stipulate that in case of 
disposal of more than 25% of the company’s assets (assessed on the balance stated in the last 
quarterly balance sheet of the company),285 such disposal must be approved by the BD. If no BD is 
formed, then the GM is required to approve it. If the disposal implicates more than 50% of the 
assets, it must be approved by the GM.  
 
Article 79, section 6 in the JSC Act and article 46, section 5 in the LLC Act provide the company 
with the right to claim a deal that is concluded in violation of the regulation of “major deals” invalid. 
A claim for damages, however, must be based on articles 71 and 44. A violation of the regulation on 
“major deals” constitutes a wrongful act in itself, but in order to be liable on the basis of articles 71 
and 44, as mentioned above in this subsection, the claimant must prove that this violation also 
implies a violation of the Duties. As mentioned under section 7.6, it is typically easier to get a claim 
affirmed if it is previously affirmed as invalid by the court.286 
 
An exception from the prescribed procedure for affirming major deals involves situations in which 
such disposal is a part of the company’s “normal business operations”. The term is similar to the 
term under article 84 in the JSC Act and article 45 in the LLC Act, which regulate deals involving a 
“personal interest”287 (see section 8.3) and provides an exception from the procedure of approval if 
the deal is a part of “normal business operations.” The terms are to be understood equally. 
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The GM may approve the deal subsequently, pursuant to Supreme Court (SC) and SAC 9 
Resolution December 1999 No 90/40, item 20.288 
 
If the deal is both “major” and with “personal interest”, the article 79, section 5, states that the deal 
is subjected to the regulation that addresses deals involving personal interests. This regulation 
provides for its own liability base, as well (see section 8.3). The Act on LLC has no equivalent rule 
in this situation. Thus, the claimant should base his claim on a violation of both regulations.  
 
7.8 How to prove that the conditions are met and problems with the burden of 
evidence 
7.8.1 The presumption of good faith reasonableness and the presumption of absence of 
negligence 
In principle, fault-based claim for damages include a presumption of negligence on behalf of the 
wrongdoer, pursuant to articles 401, section 2 and 1064, section 2 in the Civil Code. Nevertheless, 
this presumption does not apply in all situations. Article 10, section 3 in the Civil Code, provides an 
exception, stating that when good faith and reasonableness (as stated in articles 71 and 44) are the 
duties of which a violation constitutes the wrongful act, then good faith and reasonableness are 
presumed to be present.289 Most Russian authors interpret this provision in the way that it alters the 
negligence presumption with regard to liability based on articles 71 and 44 in favor of the 
managers.290 Notably, however, no distinction is made between the negligence presumption and the 
presumption of good faith and reasonableness with regard to article 10.  Since the assessments of the 
violation of the Duties and negligence are merged, the presumption of good faith and reasonableness 
precedes the presumption of the absence of negligence. Consequently, the burden of evidence for 
proving the wrongful action (violation of the Duties) and the presence of negligence are formally 
laid upon the claimant, in accordance with article 10. For instance, if the executive did not conduct 
the GM in the prescribed manner, he thus violated this concrete duty. The claimant has the burden of 
evidence for proving that the delay was a violation of a concrete obligation. In addition, and more 
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difficult to prove, the claimant must also prove that the executive neither showed good faith nor 
reasonableness and the violation of conducting the GM in the prescribed manner was not in the 
interests of the company. When this is proved, however, in most cases the negligence will also be 
proved. There are none of the reviewed court cases that apply a presumption for negligence. 
There is an ongoing discussion on whether or not the presumption of good faith and reasonableness 
with regard to managers is an apt solution. The main reason to stipulate a presumption of good faith 
and reasonableness is, according to Molotnikov and Osipenko,291 that if the burden of proof had 
remained with the executive, this would result in a reduction in willingness to accept the position as 
executive and increase the chances of minority shareholders’ “greenmailing” the executive.292 
According to court practice and the majority of scholars, the problem of the high thresholds favors 
the executive in the negligence/bad faith/reasonableness assessment.293 This is especially due to the 
fact that the thresholds for considering something proven, when there is a presumption for the 
opposite, are quite high in Russian courts. This may lead to many cases in which material legitimate 
claims are lost because of the way judges apply the rules on evidence. Thus, from the author’s point 
of view, since the executive is in a far stronger position than minority shareholders, and since the 
latter’s interests are worth protecting, one might question the suitability of the presumption rule.294 
 
In comparison, the principle of presumption of negligence, including for the executives, prevails in 
Germany.295 Under Norwegian law, the claimant has the burden of proof for establishing the 
defendant’s negligence.296 However, if the court finds that the action of the executive was, from an 
objective angle, wrongful (e.g.  he violated an instruction of the GM or violated a statutory provision 
when conducting the business of the company), it is the executive that must prove that there are 
subjective elements that excuse the wrongful act (known as the rule of “pending the burden of 
proof”), and in this way prove that he was not negligent.297 
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7.8.2 What the claimant must prove in a claim for damages based on articles 71 and 44 
In addition to the presumption of good faith, reasonableness and absence of negligence, the claimant 
has the burden of proof for all other assertions that he advances, pursuant to article 65 in the APC. 
The article states that a party’s assertions must be proven by the same party that is putting them 
forward. With regard to claims for damages, SAC Resolution 22 Mai 2007, no 872/07, states that 
the defendant must prove: losses, the size of the losses, the causality between the act and wrongful 
act, negligence and the wrongful act. This establishes the whole burden of proof on the claimant. 
The court’s statement was based on article 65 in the APC.298 
  
In addition to the burden of proving a violation of the Duties, another difficulty has arisen in 
practice with regard to indirect lawsuits. In some cases, shareholders have also had to prove that his 
interests or rights are infringed by the wrongful act. This is due to the formulation of article 15 in 
the Civil Code, stating that “the person, who had his rights infringed, may claim full recovery”.299 In 
a claim based on articles 71 and 44, the company is the entity whose rights are infringed, not 
(directly) the shareholder. Obviously, the shareholder still has indirect interests in the recovery of 
losses for the company. That notwithstanding, the indirect interest has not, in some cases, been 
sufficient for Russian courts to overcome the wording in article 15. For instance, FAC Resolution 
Moscow District 15 December 2005 no KG-A40/12187-05, and SAC Resolution 22 Mai 2007 no 
872/07, conclude that the stockholder must also prove that his rights are infringed according to 
article 15. Due to diverging practice, it is uncertain whether this sets forth a general requirement, or 
if it was a “one-time case”. To be sure, the claimant should be prepared to prove some sort of 
infringement.300 Nonetheless, it should be relatively easy to prove the link between the direct loss for 
the company and the indirect loss for the shareholder. 
 
7.9 The form of liability for the managing company 
The Civil Code article 103, the Act on JSC article 69 and the Act on LLC article 42 all state the 
possibility to transfer the power of the executive body to a managing company. The managing 
company acts in the name and on the account of the company, according to article 53 in the Civil 
                                                 
298
 The large majority of the examined court rulings state a heavy burden of proof on the claimant. See e.g. FAC North-
Caucasian District, 17 August 2006 N Ф08-3470/2006, FAC Northwest District, 5 April 2004 N А66-5248-03 and FAC 
West-Sibirian District, 15 September 2005 no 4-5645/2005 14403-А75-8.  
299
 “Лицо, право которого нарушено, может требовать полного возмещения”.  
300
 Osipenko, pp. 477 and 483; Dobrovolskiy, p. 235. 
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Code. Article 401, section 3 in the Civil Code stipulates strict liability, with an exception for force 
majeure during breaches of contractual provisions when the liable party is performing as a 
professional commercial party (as a managing company does). The question at stake is whether or 
not the Acts on JSC and LLC (providing fault-based liability), as Lex Specialis rule, alter the 
general statement of article 401. Article 401, section 3 is facultative and states that it derogates in 
favor of other federal acts. Thus, the Acts on JSC and LLC state an exception from the main rule. 
Mogilevsky takes it for granted that articles 71 and 44 also establish fault-based liability for the 
managing company.301 Telyokina also takes this position, stating in her Commentary that article 71 
in the JSC Act makes a favorable position for managing companies.302 On the other hand, Makarova 
asserts that managing companies bear liability independently of negligence, but without 
substantiating it.303 In fact, the question of the matter has more theoretical interest. This is due to the 
fact that the Duties in articles 71 and 44 provide an assessment that coincides with the negligence 
assessment, thus narrowing a potential strict liability with exceptions for a force majeure basis to a 
virtual fault-based liability.304 In this way, a managing company will benefit from the “good faith” 
and “reasonableness” duties and only become liable if it acted negligently. As the hiring of 
managing companies is not that widespread among Russian companies, the author did not find any 
court practice that cast further light on this issue.  
 
A claim for damages from third persons on the basis of the managing company’s actions done in the 
name of the managed company will be directed against the managed company. In case of an 
approbation of such a claim, this allows for a recourse claim from the managed company against the 
managing company. The recourse claim may be based on article 71 or 44.  
 
7.10 Conclusions with regard to the assessment of Duties 
As stated above, there are several problems with the application of the Duties. The distinction of the 
wrongful act condition under the Duties and the negligence condition presents a particular problem. 
From the author’s point of view, it may be more appropriate to follow the idea of a “self-
enforcement” model (as described in section 3.1) with a set of more clearly defined rules when it 
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 Mogilevskiy, chapter 10.1. Mogilevskiy S D, Legal basis for activities in Joint Stock Companies: Textbook 
(Правовые основы деятельности акционерных обществ: Учебник), Delo (Дело) Publishing House, 2004 (provided 
by Garant, without paginating). 
302
 Telyokina, to article 64. 
303
 Makarova, heading 4, section 5, subsection 7. 
304
 Black, et al, p. 136. 
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comes to the question of liability for managers. As of today, the Russian legal precedence on how to 
aptly define the degree of good faith and reasonableness is nearly absent.305 Chanturia, for instance, 
is highly critical of the vague standards and supports strict liability in cases of violation.306 As 
Molotnikov also concludes, application of the articles is not adequately regulated and further 
elaboration by the legislature is required.307 Black et al. suggest that a non-exhaustive criteria be 
established for any conduct considered to be in “bad-faith” and unreasonable in concrete 
situations.308  
 
Furthermore, the relationship between the different liability bases is problematic. This might include 
the relationship between article 71 and the liability regulation in the Labor Code, as well as the 
liability bases in the Civil Code, such as article 53, and liability bases in other federal acts. The 
nuances and the relations between these bases are not sufficiently elaborated by the legislature, court 
practice or legal literature.309 This, together with high thresholds for proving a claim, is unfortunately 
likely to result in the material loss of legitimate claims.  
 
Finally, it should be unnecessary for the claimant to prove some sort of infringement,310 as it should 
be obvious that he has an economic interest in the recovery of company losses. On the whole, it is 
concluded that the legal stance concerning liability for the executive with regard to court practice 
and legal literature is neither uniform nor determent, and calls for further elaboration and 
clarification. 
 
Companies should adopt the Code of Corporate Governance, and the articles of association should 
clearly stipulate the grounds for managerial liability.  Companies should also assess the need to limit 
the executive’s right to act and sign in the name of the company,(or share it with the chairman of the 
BD), to minor dealings in daily business operations. In particular, competence to represent the 
company during legal proceedings is an essential role that should not be limited to the executive of 
the company, i.e. shared with the chairman of the BD. 
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 Black, et al, p. 25. 
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 Chanturiya,  p. 29. 
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 Molotnikov, p. 182. 
308
 Black, et al, p 25. 
309
 When it comes to recommendations of legislative amendments concerning liability for managers, the report of Black 
et al gives a detailed discussion on different solutions that could improve the legislation on this matter. 
310
 Osipenko, pp. 477 and 483. Dobrovolskiy, p. 235. 
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7.10.1 Are serious problems of affirming a claim for damages in conflict with the provisions in 
the European Human Rights Convention? 
An interesting question is whether or not the procedural obstacles in an indirect lawsuit, the problem 
of burden of proof and the lack of possibilities to enforce an appropriated claim for damages 
constitute a violation of the ECHR article 6, stipulating a “rightful legal procedure” and the optional 
protocol 1 to the ECHR, article 1, stipulating the right to protection of property. Both Conventions 
are ratified by the Russian Federation. Unfortunately, these questions are too extensive for further 
elaboration in this thesis. 
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8 Particular regulation and bases of liability in certain situations 
This section concerns civil liability with other special bases than articles 71 and 44.311 Since the 
main focus of this thesis is on articles 71 and 44, the following only provides an overview of 
different types of liability bases. Some emphasis, however, is put on claims based on the provision 
regulating personal interest,312 as this is of the most practical interest to the company and its 
shareholders (in addition to articles 71 and 44). 
 
Notably, the relationship between the specific and general bases in articles 44 and 71 in the Acts on 
JSC and LLC are not elaborated upon in Russian legislation or literature (cf. sections 7.2 and 
7.10).313 However, section 2 of articles 71 and 44 states that the articles may be derogated from if 
other federal acts do stipulate another basis. Thus, the claimant may choose another applicable 
liability base if the liability bases are overlapping. 
 
8.1 The labor regulation as a legal basis of liability for the executive 
At present, there is a discussion on the labor legislation’s position on the executive with regard to 
company legislation.314 The Labor Code also provides a liability base for managers.315 Article 277 in 
the Labor Code, section 1, states that the executive has “full material liability for direct, real 
damages”.316 “Real damages” are defined in article 15 in the civil code (see section 9 for elaboration) 
and do not encompass lost profit.  
 
                                                 
311
 Note that the conditions for liability concerning economic loss and causality treated in section 8 and 9 with special 
regard to articles 71 and 44 will generally apply to these bases of liability as well. 
312
 See definition of this term in n 167. 
313
 The author was not able to reveal any meaningful literature or judicial practice on this matter. Probably this is due to 
such question may have not been put properly on stake yet in practice. 
314
 See e.g. Pasjin; Black, et al, pp. 121-135. 
315
 See Black, et al, p. 123; See definition in n 10 for the term “manager”. 
316
 ”Руководитель организации несет полную материальную ответственность за прямой действительный ущерб, 
причиненный организации.”; “Material damages” (“материальная ответственность”) is the liability form that applies 
to the relations between the employer and employee in the Labor Code. It implies that only real damage (i.e. excluding 
lost profit) can be claimed by the sufferer (see section 9.3.1). 
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Section 2 states that managers may be liable on bases set forth by other federal acts, such as articles 
71 and 44.317 If another basis is applied, “losses are to be understood as losses in the civil 
legislation.” This implies a reference to article 15 in the Civil Code, which regulates the 
measurement of the size of losses in a claim for damages, as it indicates “full recovery” of losses.318 
Naturally, full recovery is a more favorable to claim than real damages, as it includes lost profit. 
Hence, from the claimant’s point of view, the liability bases in articles 71 and 44 are more favorable 
for making a claim. It is also notable that the material found in the literature and in practice deals 
with claims for damages against executives is based on articles 71 and 44 ,319 and not labor 
legislation. 
 
8.2 Stockholder’s and company’s direct claim on the basis of article 71, section 2, 
subsection 2 
The Act on JSC states fault-based liability for the executive directly vis-à-vis stockholders320 in one 
specific situation (cf. section 4.3). Pursuant to article 71, section 2, subsection 2, the executive is 
“(…) liable vis-à-vis the company and the stockholder for the negligent violation of the procedure of 
subscription of stocks, regulated by section 11.1 in the Act”.321 Section 11.1 consists of articles 84.1 
– 84.10. Since this provision states direct liability vis-à-vis the stockholder, the stockholder can 
claim his loss, regardless of the company’s loss. The company may concurrently claim its own 
losses against the executive on basis of the same violation of section 11.1.  
 
Section 11.1 outlines a detailed procedure with regard to the acquisition of more than 30% of the 
stocks in an open JSC company. Section 11.1 is a new provision stipulated to protect the 
stockholder’s and the company’s interests and to ensure that the executive does not hamper such 
acquisitions. Article 84.3 lists a number of duties for the company to perform, in the form of the 
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 ”В случаях, предусмотренных федеральными законами, руководитель организации возмещает организации 
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 See the commantary to article 277 in Ananevuy K Y, et al, Commentaries to the Labor Code (Комментарий к 
Трудовому кодексу), Omega L (Омега-Л) Publishing House, 2007 (hereinafter, Ananevuy). 
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 E.g. Telyokina, to article 69, section 3, subsection 3; Makovskaya. pp. 7-8; The author has not been able to find one 
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 See definition in n 36. 
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 ”(…) несут ответственность перед обществом или акционерами за убытки, причиненные их виновными 
действиями (бездействием), нарушающими порядок приобретения акций открытого общества, 
предусмотренный главой XI.1 настоящего Федерального закона.”. 
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executive, when it receives an offer to purchase more than 30% of the stocks. For example, the 
executive has to communicate the offer to the stockholders. If the executive fails or even hinders the 
accomplishment of such transactions, he may be liable. Owing to the fact that articles 71, section 2, 
subsection 2 stipulate fault-based liability, the liability depends firstly on the presence of a violation 
of the said procedures, constituting the wrongful act. Second, the violation has to be committed 
negligently. Third, there has to be an economic loss proximate to the violation (cf. section 6.1). 
 
8.3 Liability in cases of the personal interest of the executive entering deals made in 
the name of the company  
Heading 9 in the JSC Act (articles 81-84) contains a special regulation regarding situations in which 
the executive has a personal interest.322 Article 84 in the JSC Act provides a special liability basis for 
the executive if he concludes a deal with personal interest without following the special procedure 
that is stipulated in heading 9 for concluding such deals. In principle, the area of application of this 
liability base falls within the scope of article 71. Legislators chose, 323 however, to provide a more 
concretely formulated liability basis in this article, as it has been an ongoing problem in Russia that 
executives act with personal interests. 324  
 
Article 84, section 2, states that the executive is liable vis-à-vis the company. Thus the shareholder 
may not file an indirect lawsuit on this basis.325  
 
The provision states that the executive is liable if he violates the procedure for entering deals with a 
possible personal interest. It does not mention whether this liability is fault-based or strict. Pursuant 
to article 401 in the Civil Code, liability in contractual relations is fault-based if nothing else is 
stipulated. When interpreting the article in light of the general provisions in the Civil Code, the 
negligence condition should be implemented into article 84, in accordance with article 401.326  
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 However, there is a discussion whether this protection is efficient. Shitkina, p. 509 asserts that the regulation of the 
presentation of information is not sufficient in order to be an effective protection of the shareholders interests. Nor are 
there many cases based on this provision. The author found only few cases that treats article 84, section 2, which of only 
two gave some meaningful considerations. 
325
 Nevertheless, both provisions seeks to protect the interests of the company, and hence indirectly the shareholders. It 
should be appropriate to stipulate the same possibility for the shareholders to file an indirect lawsuit, as provided in 
article 44 and 71 with regard to the LLC Act 45 and JSC Act 84. 
326
 Same in Black, et al, p. 52. 
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Article 84 in the JSC Act states two possible legal consequences and remedies for 
restoration:  a claim for invalidation of the deal (first section) and a claim for 
damages (second section). Telyokina asserts that in order to claim for damages on 
the basis of second section, the deal must be found invalid beforehand, without 
substantiating this any further.
327
 The article could be interpreted to mean that it 
would be more likely to consider the two remedies as possible alternatives (since the 
remedies are expressed in different sections of the provision), or as remedies to be 
applied in combination. In support of this view, FAC North-Caucasian District 19 
August 2003 no Ф08-2955/03 stated that an earlier invalidation of a deal grounded 
on article 84, section 1 does not have prejudicial character when deciding the 
question of awarding damages. 
 
 
8.3.1 The corresponding provision in the LLC Act 
Article 45 in the LLC Act contains a corresponding provision that stipulates a specific procedure for 
concluding deals in which the executive has a personal interest. There is, however, one important 
difference between article 45 and article 84, which is that the former does not stipulate that one 
becomes liable if the provision is violated. In this manner, article 45 does not provide a liability 
basis, while the general liability basis in article 44 still applies. Thus, it needs to be assessed whether 
a violation of article 45 constitutes a violation of the Duties provided in article 44, as well. Since 
article 45 does not provide a liability base, only the provisions in the JSC Act are discussed in this 
section. However, much of the following is relevant for the interpretation of article 45 in the LLC 
Act.  
 
It should be noted that article 45 does not mention the managing company in the list of subjects that 
are included in the regulation of personal interest. The Commentary on article 45 states that the 
managing company is included but does not provide any further elaboration.328 Since the 
participants’329 interests are supposed to be protected by this article330, perhaps the only reason it is 
excluded is due to a mistake by the legislature. The solution should be regarded as undetermined.  
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 Telyokina, to article 84. 
328
 See the commentary to article 45 in Kryrov A A., Commentaries to the Federal Act on “Companies with Limited 
Liability” (Комментарий к Федеральному закону “Об обществах с ограниченной ответственностью). Moscow, 
Publishing House “Prospekt”, 2006 (Kryrov).  
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 See definition of this term in n 36. 
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 Shitkina, p. 506. 
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8.3.2 Further regulation on personal interest 
Articles 80-84 in the Act on JSC and article 45 in the Act on the LLC regulate “deals” in which the 
executive has a personal interest. “Deal” is to be understood broadly, and article 81 defines 
pledging, bail, credit and loans into the term “deal”.331 “Deal” is also defined in article 154 in the 
Civil Code, stating that “deals” are to be understood as establishing, altering or ceasing civil rights 
and obligations. Thus, “deals” is to be interpreted widely.  
 
The first sections of articles 81 in the JSC Act and 45 in the LLC define that “personal interest” is 
present in a deal when the other party, beneficiary party, middleman or representativeis a spouse,332  
parent, child, siblings-half-siblings (he LLC article 45 does, however, not include half siblings), 
adopted child or adopted parents, the executive himself or other “affiliated persons”.333 If any of 
these owns more than 20% in a company, or holds a leading position in a company, they are 
considered to be associated with the company. “Affiliated persons” is a term used in several 
instances in Russian legislation. The definition is given in article 4 in the Act on “Competition and 
Limitation of Monopolistic Business in the Market”,334 and it defines a number of different positions 
in companies and stock holding thresholds which make someone “affiliated”. For instance, if a 
person is holding a position as a higher company official or holding a certain amount of stocks in the 
company, this person is “affiliated” with the company. The articles of association may provide other 
caveats that dictate personal interest, pursuant to the last section, article 81 in the JSC Act and the 
last sentence, first section in article 45 in the LLC Act. The general meeting (GM) may subsequently 
approve the deal, although this is not directly stated in the Acts.335 
 
Articles 82 and 83 provide a detailed procedure that is to be presented to the GM or the board of 
directors (BD) in order for them to approve any deal in which there is a personal interest. Article 45 
is not as detailed as the JSC Act when it comes to regulating the mandatory presentation of 
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 “Сделки”; “handel”/”avtale”.  
332
 “Cтороной, выгодоприобретателем, посредником или представителем”. It should be noted that these terms do 
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335
 Shitkina, pp. 513-514, with further references to practice. 
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information to the GM or the process of approval. If the executive enters into such a deal without 
following this procedure, he is liable for losses inflicted on the company, pursuant to article 84.  
 
Article 45, section 4 in the LLC Act and article 83, section 5 in the JSC Act provide an exemption 
for deals that are a part of the company’s “normal business operations” and if that type of business 
operations took place before the executive with a personal interest was recognized as such. Article 
83 stipulates the same provision but nuances it by stating that similar deals with similar conditions 
must have been entered earlier. This also applies to a LLC, according to a court decision,336 as it 
states that when proving “normal commercial business”, it must be indicated that similar deals have 
been conducted previously. The Supreme Court (SC) and Supreme Arbitrazjniy Court (SAC) 
Resolution, 9 December 1999, N90/14, item 20 mentions that such a transaction may take form as 
“realization of products; acquisition of raw material; carrying out work, etc.”. The exception is only 
valid until the next session of the GM. The phrase “normal business operations” is similar to that 
used in article 46 in the LLC Act and article 79 in the JSC Act concerning ”major transactions” (cf. 
section 7.7.5.2).  
 
8.4 Liability when exposing commercial secrets 
The “Act on Commercial Secrets” article 11, lists a number of obligations and provisions in order to 
protect commercial secrets. For instance, it prohibits the disclosure of commercial secrets and using 
them for personal interest without permission (section 2, subsection 2). Section 6 of the article 
obliges the manager to secure such secrets and stipulates that the rule is invariable. Section 7 states 
liability for managers if they violate of the provisions in article 11 with liability vis-à-vis the 
company. The liability is defined in accordance with the general regulation on civil liability, 
pursuant to the last sentence of section 7. As the relationship is contractual, article 401 in the Civil 
Code applies, which provides a fault-based liability. In order to become liable on the basis of article 
11, section 7 in the Act on Commercial Secrets, a commercial secret must be revealed in violation of 
the regulation in the Act, thus constituting a wrongful act. In addition, negligence, causality and 
losses must be present (see section 6.2).  The general rule in civil liability on measurement of losses 
is provided in article 15 in the Civil Code, which states “full recovery” and applies to damage claims 
based on article 11 (see section 9).  
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 Cf. FAC Ural District 6 April 2005, N F09-746/05-GК-С5.  
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Moreover, the scope of articles 71 in the JSC Act and 44 in the LLC would typically encompass 
situations involving the revelation of commercial secrets, as this is not in the interests of the 
company, not in good faith and not reasonable. However, this alternative is harder to prove, as the 
claimant needs to not only prove the violation of The Act on Commercial Secrets, but also how this 
violates the Duties. This would be, albeit, the only option if a shareholder wants to initiate an 
indirect claim for damages. This is due to the fact that article 11 does not provide for an indirect 
lawsuit and only the company may base its claim on article 11. 
 
8.5 Liability regulated by the Act on Securities 
The Act on the “Security Market”, heading 5 (articles 19-27) regulates issue of securities and shares. 
Article 22.1 states liability for the executive together with the company or either one under the 
process of an issue vis-à-vis the stockholder if a prospect of stocks contains incorrect information. 
The article states a fault-based liability basis in this instance. Therefore, in order to be liable, the 
incorrect information, which constitutes the wrongful act, must be committed negligently. 
Furthermore, the wrongful act must be a proximate cause to the economic loss. “Loss” in this article 
is worded as “real damage”, which excludes lost profit (see section 9).337  
 
The time limit for filing the case is 3 years from the date that the issue was released by IPO or from 
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 “Ущерб” (translated as “damage”/”loss”) is the word the legislation applies when referring only to real damage, not 
including lost profit. If lost profit is to be included, the term “убытки” is applied (also translated as “damage”/”loss”). 
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9 Economic damage 
9.1 The company’s loss 
The Acts on JSC and LLC, article 71, section 2 and article 44, section 2 state that the executive is 
liable for losses he inflicted on the company.338 Losses are generally defined in the Civil Code article 
15, section 2 and apply for all damage claims.339 More specifically, article 393 in the Civil Code 
supplements the general article 15 and elaborates the measurement of losses in a claim for damages 
originated from a contractual relationship.340 The burden of proving the losses is with the 
responsibility of the claimant.341 
 
The economic loss condition may be separated into two questions. The first asks what is to be 
understood as economic, and the second asks how to measure the economic loss.342 The limit of the 
thesis does not allow a thorough examination of these issues, so only the outline is provided here.  
 
It should be noted that in an indirect lawsuit from a shareholder, it is not relevant to consider his 
losses. As the company is the sufferer, it is only the company’s loss that may be claimed. As such, 
only the company’s loss and some general considerations are treated in the following section. 
 
9.2 What is economic damage/loss 
In legal literature, “losses” or “loss” is to be understood as “damage, expressed in the form of 
money”.343 This follows indirectly from the formulations in article 393. The material damage may be 
recovered in kind, according to the article 393, section 3.344 For instance, if the executive shows 
negligence in maintaining production equipment, he could restore an affirmed claim for damages in 
kind. The same applies if the executive has stolen from the company. 
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 In principle, the Civil Code distinguishes between different types of damages, such as “losses” and other forms of 
damages (moral harm, harm on life and health, commercial reputation etc.). 
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 See e.g. Molotnikov, p. 156. 
340
 Sadikov, to article 15. 
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 Abovoy, article 393. Sadikov, article 393. 
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 The approach is common in Norwegian law, but the Russian literature does not split up the loss condition in this way. 
Nevertheless, the distinction is useful for structuring the discussion of the condition.  
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 The quotation referrers to same wording in both Molotnikov, p. 156 and Shitkina, p. 474. 
344
 Resolution SC/SAC, 1 of July 1996 N 6/8, item 49. 
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When interpreting the term “economic”, it is often difficult to distinguish between an economic loss 
and other kinds of harm. For example, if a shareholder does not get the chance to vote on the general 
meeting (GM) due to illegitimate actions by the executive, this does not necessarily lead to an 
economic loss for the shareholder in question. On the same token, a harmed business reputation for 
the company will not always represent an economic loss, but it may in turn induce economic losses. 
The assessment of a harmed reputation is relevant in corporate relations, as negative media exposure 
caused by the executive’s actions may cause harm to the company. When it comes to harming the 
commercial reputation of the company, an alternative to articles 71 and 44 may be found in article 
152 in the Civil Code, which specifically provides a liability basis in cases of intentional public 
damage to one’s commercial reputation.  
 
9.3 Measuring the size of the loss 
Article 15 expresses the principle of “full recovery”. This implies that no enrichment of the claimant 
is possible. Thus, if there are saved expenses or income advantages for the claimant related to the 
violation, this must be withdrawn when measuring the size of the claim.345 Article 15, section 1, 
subsection 2, states that if the defendant generated income as a consequence of the violation, the 
claimant may claim no less than that which the defendant generated as a result of this consequence.  
 
The “full recovery” rule contains the elements of real damages and lost profit. 
 
9.3.1 Real damage 
Real damages are “expenses” incurred,346 or expenses that will be incurred in the future, which a 
person has to undertake to restore the violated right or harmed asset, pursuant to article 15. For 
example, costs of purchasing new production factors in exchange for production factors that have 
“disappeared” under the supervision of the executive and for which he has became liable. Or, this 
may appear as costs for restoring assets that are sold from the company at a value that is under the 
market price. 
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 Abovoy, article 393. 
346
 “Расходы” (“utgift”) is translated not only as “expenses” but comprises “disbursements”, spending”, “charge”, 
“burden” and “costs” as well. 
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Article 393, section 3, elaborates how to measure the restoration costs of an asset in contractual 
relationships. It states that the expenses are measured in the place where the obligation is to be 
fulfilled. Presumably, this is the company’s physical address.347 Further, the expenses are determined 
by the costs on the date the obligation should be fulfilled, or if no such date is provided for, the day 
the lawsuit was filed. At the discretion of the court (guided by the principle of full recovery), the 
court may also consider the costs at the time of delivering the judgment.348 
 
According to the wording of the article, the claimant has to restore the creditor’s loss.349 For 
instance, if the violated right refers to an asset that is sold under market price, it is not the difference 
between the price for the sold asset and the market price that is claimed but the cost of restoring the 
asset. If the asset is generic, a similar asset may be purchased. If it is a specie type of asset and the 
original asset cannot be restored, the restoration is accomplished with financial compensation based 
on the market price of the asset.  
 
When it comes to restoring expenses that will accrue in the future, there is little elaboration.  
However, Supreme Court (SC) and Supreme Arbitrazjniy Court (SAC) Resolution, 1 of July 1996 N 
6/8, item 10 emphasizes that such claims must be verified thoroughly with evidence and that this 
may be done in the form of cost estimates for restoring the loss that is caused by the default. Only 
necessary and reasonable expenses may be affirmed and they must be incurred within reasonable 
time limits.350  
 
Furthermore, a claim for damages against the executive as a result of a third party’s claim against 
the company will amount to the size of the claim from the third party, in addition to court expenses, 
in accordance with the “full recovery” rule.  
 
9.3.2 Lost profit 
Lost profit is uncollected income, which the sufferer would have gained if his right had not been 
violated.351 According to Sadikov, “losses (...) are also missed income, which the sufferer would 
                                                 
347
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348
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351
 See eg Black, et al, p. 90. 
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have gained under normal conditions for daily business operations if it had not been for the 
infringement”,352 pursuant to article 15, section 2, subsection 1. According to SC/SAC Resolution, 1 
of July 1996 N 6/8, item 11, when assessing the income based on “normal conditions for daily 
business operations”, this must take into account an estimate of reasonable expenditures that the 
claimant would have if the obligations were rightfully fulfilled. For example, if the executive sells a 
production factor under the market price, the lost profit is estimated as the net profit that would have 
been generated if this production factor had not been sold.353 
 
9.4 Assessing losses with regard to articles 71 and 44, sections 3  
Article 71, section 3 in the JSC Act and article 44, section 3 in the LLC Act allow for business 
custom and other circumstances to be taken into account (cf. section 7.5) when assessing the size of 
liability. This implies taking into consideration the degree of negligence/intention or the “bad faith” 
of the defendant when assessing the size of the recovery. This opens possible mitigation of the 
recovery under certain circumstances, such as when the losses were causes unintentionally and his 
actions could be considered somewhat excusable.354 Nonetheless, this provision is not elaborated 
upon in Russian law.  Consequently, as stated by Ivanov, it remains to be worked out in practice.355 
Osipenko concludes that the courts are reluctant to give a clear conception of this provision.356   
 
Exceptions from the “full recovery” rule may arise when there are circumstances that influenced the 
loss that were under the company’s own responsibilities. This might be interpreted in Article 71, 
section 3 in the JSC Act and article 44, section 3 in the LLC Act. For example, if the board of 
directors (BD) did nothing to fulfill their duty to mitigate losses that originated from the wrongful 
action of the executive. In this situation it is arguable that the executive should not sustain the full 
recovery. This exception is not as clearly provided for in Russian law as it is in Norwegian law. 
Under Norwegian law, there is a general duty for the sufferer to mitigate his losses.  
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The condition of causality is generally recognized as a condition for civil liability.357 In contracts, 
this may be derived from article 393, section 1 in the Civil Code, stating that the debtor shall restore 
losses to the creditor that are caused by his non-fulfillment of obligations.358 The condition also 
ensues from an interpretation of the phrase “losses caused to the company” in section 2 of articles 71 
and 44 in the Acts on JSC and LLC.359 
 
The wrongful act must be the objective reason for the loss and it “must cause the same loss in every 
similar situation, and should not be caused by any coincidences”,360 as Syxanov states. And further, 
he emphasizes that it is not enough that the harmful action or inaction is a condition for the loss, but 
the reason for it must always lead to the same result. Seemingly, he then asserts that it must be an 
absolute cause-and-effect relationship.361  
 
There are a few court decisions that elaborate the nuances of what it takes to prove causality. 
Practice, however, shows that there are difficulties in establishing a cause-and effect relationship 
between a manager’s actions and subsequent losses.362 
 
Nevertheless, some fundamental conditions may be derived. First, the breach of the obligation must 
precede the losses.363 Second, the breach of the obligation must be a necessary and sufficient 
prerequisite for the entry of the loss.364 It should be noted that to prove causality, one must 
demonstrate written evidence in order to get the court’s support since Russian courts emphasize 
written evidence.365 Taking into these conditions into consideration, the threshold to uphold a claim 
presents serious difficulties if the cause is not obvious. 
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Furthermore, even if the cause is exclusive and traceable, the loss has to be a foreseeable 
consequence of the wrongful act. This rule is provided for in most Western legislation. Under 
Norwegian liability law, this is known as the adequate-rule,366 and in Anglo-American law, this is 
often referred to as “proximate cause”. Under Russian law, Molotnikov and Sjitkina underscore that 
in a claim for damages originated from corporate relations, the cause must be adequate to the loss in 
order to claim it restored.367  Unfortunately, they do not elaborate on this any further.  Efeev asserts 
that in Russian legal theory and practice, the causality condition and principle of proximate cause 
have been neglected and regarded as not presenting any difficulties in practice and that these 
conditions are more suitable for a theoretical examination than a practical one. 368  He underscores 
that it has not taken a firm stand on these questions as a matter of Russian liability law, but 
concludes that when assessing the causality condition, this should be guided by the adequate 
principle.369 Moreover, he concludes that modern Russian legal literature is inclined to recognize the 
adequacy principle, without substantiating this further. Efeev points out that the adequate principle 
does not restrain the court’s discretion, but gives it flexibility to consider if it would be reasonable to 
award the losses in question. This is especially true with regard to liability cases against executives, 
as it often will be difficult to prove lost profit. For instance, if the executive hampers the conducting 
of the general meeting (GM) and this lead to losses by preventing the affirmation of a favorable 
deal, this conduct is a proximate cause to the loss. However, if the delay of conducting the GM leads 
to a lost opportunity for entering into an unforeseen, yet favorable deal, then it is unlikely that the 
loss would be appraised as proximate. In cases where the executive exceeds his competence, the 
adequate causality is more easily proven. This is due to the fact that the exceeding one’s competence 
is usually committed in relation to the conclusion of concrete deals, in which losses can more easily 
be identified and can have more foreseeable consequences (e.g. the under-market price at which an 
asset was sold, compared with the marked price). However, the challenge is still to prove the 
proximate cause between the lost profit and the wrongful act. The burden of proving this is 
presumably heavy for the claimant. 
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In conclusion, the lack of relevant literature and relevant cases makes it difficult to provide more 
elaborate and meaningful guidelines on the proximate cause condition. This notion applies to the 
economic damage condition, as well. Hence, in a claim for damages, it is likely that the outcome 
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